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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs' statement of jurisdiction is insufficient. This Court has jurisdiction of
the appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether plaintiffs' three fraud-related arguments are rendered moot by the jury
verdict of no negligence in defendants' care of Shelly Hip well.
Standard of Review: De novo. Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah
1989).
Preservation of Issue: This issue is presented for the first time in this Court
because plaintiffs' arguments did not become moot until after the jury verdict in the
district court.
2. Whether the district court properly excluded the testimony of plaintiffs' expert
witness regarding emergency room standard of care based on the witness' lack of
qualifications.
Standard of Review: Clear abuse of discretion. Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d
339, 347 (Utah 1996).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised by pretrial motion, trial objection, and
motion for partial directed verdict. (R. 3971-72, 4568-69; Tr. 5004, Vol. II, at 381-402,
456-59; Tr. 5011, Vol. IX, at 1788-92, 1798-1802, 1814-15.)
3. Whether plaintiffs' negligence claim against McKay-Dee Hospital is barred by
the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations.

Standard of Review: De novo. Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 334,
338 (Utah 1997).
Preservation of Issue: The Hospital raised this issue in the prior appeal, as well as
before and after the statute of limitations trial. (R. 1501, 1887, 2169, 2435.)
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
The second issue, stated above, is governed by Utah R. Evid. 702. The third issue
is governed by the medical malpractice statute of limitations, U.C.A. § 78-14-4(1). Both
provisions are set forth verbatim in the Addendum (hereafter "Add.," at 106-07), attached
hereto.1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice action in which plaintiffs allege that defendants'
negligence in 1988 proximately caused the death of Shelly Hipwell in 1992. (Third
Amended Complaint, R. 277.) Plaintiffs previously obtained a monetary settlement from
the University of Utah Medical Center for this same injury and then obtained an
additional recovery from their prior legal counsel for malpractice in reaching that
settlement. See Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987 (Utah 1993).
This action, commenced in 1992, was initially decided on summary judgment as
time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations governing medical malpractice actions.

1

Plaintiffs' Addendum is completely inadequate and fails to include the record
documents required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1). Accordingly, the defendant Hospital
attaches a separate Addendum with this response brief containing this Court's prior
related opinion and the relevant rulings of the district court.
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(R. 1336-45.) On appeal from that decision, this Court affirmed and reversed in part,
remanding for trial to determine when the statute of limitations began to run as to Dr.
Healy, and whether the statute was tolled as to McKay-Dee Hospital. See Jensen v. IHC
Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 335, 338 (Utah 1997) (Add. 1). That trial, limited to the
statute of limitations defense, determined only that plaintiffs' current counsel did not have
sufficient information to trigger the statute of limitations more than two years before the
action was commenced. Plaintiffs did not attempt to prove that the statute of limitations
was tolled as to the Hospital, based on supposed concealment by Dr. Healy. (R. 2423,
2655, 2044, 2277-78.)
A second jury trial, limited to plaintiffs' claim of medical negligence, was
subsequently held over a three-week period. The jury returned a special verdict finding
that neither defendant was negligent in the care of Shelly Hipwell. (R. 4930-31.) The
district court entered final judgment for defendants based on that verdict. (R. 4939-41.)
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal from the final judgment. (R. 4966.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs are the surviving mother, husband, and children of Shelly Hipwell, now
deceased. (Third Amended Complaint, R. 277, 1fl[ 1-4.)
A.

Medical Summary.
In 1988, Shelly was pregnant with her second child. Shelly's obstetrician was

defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D., who practiced in Ogden, Utah. Dr. Healy had medical
staff privileges at McKay-Dee Hospital ("Hospital"), which is owned by defendant IHC
3

Hospitals, Inc. Shelly's pregnancy was considered high risk because she smoked
cigarettes and fetal growth was below normal rates. With complete bed rest and close
monitoring throughout the pregnancy, Shelly reached thirty-six weeks of gestation, within
two weeks of full term. At that point, Dr. Healy scheduled Shelly for induced delivery on
December 13, 1988. {Id.,ffi[5-6, 10; Tr. 5004, Vol. II, at 368-80; Tr. 5006, Vol. IV, at
915-18; Tr. 5007, Vol. V, at 1119-27; PL Exh. 20, pp. 17-33.)
On the morning of December 12, 1988, Shelly went to the Hospital emergency
room complaining of chest pain. She was examined by the emergency room physician,
Dr. King, who ordered various tests, including an EKG, blood pressure, arterial blood
gas, complete blood count, urinalysis, and urine culture. The test results were essentially
normal, giving no indication of significant disease. Accordingly, Shelly was discharged
with medication for pain and directions to follow-up with Dr. Healy the following
morning. (Tr. 5009, Vol. VII, at 1375-79; Tr. 5006, Vol. IV, at 928-35; PL Exh. 20, pp.
34-41.)
On December 13, 1988, Shelly returned to the Hospital, where Dr. Healy delivered
a healthy child by cesarean section. Shelly remained in the Hospital and was monitored
and medicated throughout that evening. (Tr. 5007, Vol. V, at 1130-37; Tr. 5008, Vol. VI,
at 1146-48; Tr. 5009, Vol. VII, at 1379-81; Tr. 5004, Vol. II, at 447-49; PI. Exh. 20, p.
47.)
On December 14, tests indicated a problem with Shelly's liver, and Dr. Healy
immediately transferred her to the intensive care unit ("ICU"). The ICU physician, Dr.
4
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At the University Medical Center, Shelly's condition slowly improved. On
December 28, she was transferred to the Medical Center's surgical ICU. On January 18,
1989, a sternal bone marrow biopsy was performed on Shelly for the purpose of
determining the cause of a sudden drop in her blood platelet count. During the course of
this biopsy, the needle pierced through her sternum and punctured her heart, leaving a
hole the size of a pencil. The pericardial sac around the heart filled with blood, creating
pressure around the heart that prevented the heart from pumping. As a result, Shelly's
brain was deprived of adequate oxygen for approximately sixteen minutes, leaving her
with irreversible brain damage in a comatose state. Shelly never recovered from this
trauma and died three years later, on May 27, 1992. (Tr. 5012, Vol. X, at 1983-2017,
2033-49; Tr. 5007, Vol. V, at 951-81, 1040-46; Tr. 5013, Vol. XI, at 2274-89; PL Exh.
20, p. 126; Third Amended Complaint, f 43.)
B.

Litigation Summary.
After learning of Shelly's injury at the University Medical Center, Dr. Healy

informed his brother, Tim Healy, an attorney, regarding a potential malpractice claim
against the Medical Center. Tim Healy contacted attorney Roger Sharp regarding
potential joint representation of Shelly and her family. Shane Hipwell entered into a
retainer agreement with Roger Sharp on February 10, 1989. Plaintiffs in this case entered
into an agreement with the University Medical Center on May 17, 1989, settling their
medical malpractice claim for $250,000. (R. 108, 160, 211, 359, 702.)
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On appeal, this Court affirmed and reversed in part. Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.,
944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997). As to claims against Dr. Healy, this Court held that the
allegations of fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations beyond attorney
Sharp's investigation, and that the sufficiency of attorney Forgette's information to
trigger the limitations period was a material issue of fact, precluding summary judgment.
Id. at 333-35. As to claims against the Hospital, the Court held, on rehearing, that Dr.
Healy's alleged cover-up tolled the statute of limitations only //plaintiffs alleged and
proved on remand that Healy was acting as the Hospital's agent and to further the
Hospital's interests. Id. at 338. In addition, this Court held that plaintiffs had raised no
substantive fraud claim separate from their claim of fraudulent concealment. Id. at 33637. Finally, the Court affirmed summary judgment for the Hospital on the constructive
fraud claim. Id. at 339-40.
On remand, the district court ordered a separate trial on the statute of limitations
issues. (R. 1493-96, Add. 24.) Prior to trial, the Hospital filed a motion for summary
judgment demonstrating that Dr. Healy, in the alleged cover-up, did not act as the
Hospital's agent or in furtherance of its interests so as to toll the limitations period on
claims against the Hospital. (R. 1501.) The district court denied the motion, expressly
reserving the issue for trial. (R. 1887-94, Add. 28.) However, the court thereafter
approved a special verdict form proposed by plaintiffs, addressing only whether attorney
Forgette acquired sufficient information to trigger the limitations period more than two
years before the action was commenced. (R. 1978, 2013-15, Add. 36.) Plaintiffs did not
8

seek a jury determination on whether Dr. Healy's alleged cover-up could be imputed to
the Hospital, as required to toll the limitations period invoked by the Hospital. In fact,
plaintiffs filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of agency in the statute of
limitations trial (R. 2044), and the district court granted that motion (R. 2277-78, Add.
39), over the Hospital's opposition (R. 2169).
Following a five-day trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding that attorney
Forgette did not reasonably discover the legal injury to Shelly Hipwell prior to December
16, 1989, two years before notice of the action was filed. (R. 2423, Add. 42.) The
Hospital, in objecting to the proposed order, again maintained that claims against the
Hospital were barred because plaintiffs had failed to prove that Dr. Healy's alleged fraud
tolled the limitations period on those claims. (R. 2435.) Without ruling on that objection,
the district court denied defendants' motion for judgment NOV or new trial and set the
matter for a negligence trial against both defendants. (R. 2465, 2655, Add. 43.)
Prior to trial on the merits, plaintiffs moved to file a fourth amended complaint to
"clarify" their fraud claim. (R. 2625.) Among other changes, plaintiffs sought to allege
that Dr. Healy was acting as an agent of the Hospital in pursuing his alleged cover-up (R.
2636-37,1f 33), the very issue that plaintiffs successfully excluded from the statute of
limitations trial as "irrelevant" (R. 2052,2278). In response, defendants filed a motion to
confirm dismissal of the fraud claim based on this Court's decision in Jensen, supra, at
336-37. (R. 2665-75.) The district court agreed with defendants, rejecting the existence
of an independent fraud claim. The court reasoned that plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment
9

claim pertained only to tolling of the statute of limitations and did not constitute a
separate substantive claim. Accordingly, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
the fraud claim and denied plaintiffs' motion to amend the fraud claim. (R. 2750-58,
Add. 48.)
Having failed to convert their fraudulent concealment claim into a substantive
fraud claim, plaintiffs next attempted to get their fraud evidence in by filing a pretrial
motion to allow evidence of "admissions by conduct" on the part of Dr. Healy.
Specifically, plaintiffs sought to prove Dr. Healy's negligence through evidence of his
alleged cover-up. (R. 3666-67.) The Hospital joined Dr. Healy in opposing this motion
because such evidence not only lacked probative value as to negligence, but would likely
taint the Hospital by association, as well as confuse the jury as to the limited issue of
negligence. (R. 3697-3700.) The district court initially ruled that plaintiffs could
introduce evidence showing obstruction of justice. (R. 4567-68, Add. 56.) However, at
trial, after hearing plaintiffs' proffer of cover-up evidence, the court found no nexus with
Dr. Healy's medical care and excluded the evidence under Utah R. Evid. 403, ruling that
the evidence was more prejudicial than probative and would also unfairly taint the
Hospital. (Tr. 5008, Vol. VI, at 1226-59.)
Finally, the Hospital filed a pretrial motion to exclude the testimony of plaintiffs'
expert witness, Dr. Greg DeVore, concerning the standard of care governing emergency
medicine specialists. The motion was based on the fact that Dr. DeVore is an obstetrician
who lacks the experience, training, and qualifications to testify regarding the quality of
10

care provided by an emergency physician in the Hospital emergency room. (R. 3971-72,
3980-4004.) The district court conditionally granted the motion, ruling that while Dr.
DeVore could provide expert testimony on other facets of Shelly's care, he was not
qualified to testify regarding her treatment in the emergency room. (R. 4568-69, Add.
57.)
C.

Negligence Trial.
At trial, the parties stipulated that "Shelly Hipwell died . . . as a result of

complications from anoxic brain injury suffered on or about January 18, 1989, while a
patient at the University of Utah Hospital." (R. 4682-83, Add. 59.) The parties agreed,
and the jury was instructed, that "the University Hospital was negligent in its treatment of
Shelly Hipwell and that such negligence was a cause of Shelly Hipwell's brain injury and
death." (R. 4895.) The overriding issue at trial was whether negligence by defendants in
this case was a contributing proximate cause of Shelly's subsequent brain injury and
death.
In essence, plaintiffs' case at trial focused on whether defendants were negligent in
failing to deliver Shelly's baby one day sooner, in failing to diagnose HELLP Syndrome
one day sooner, in failing to perform surgery on her liver a few hours sooner, and in
transferring her to the University Medical Center, where her heart was punctured.
Allegations against the Hospital were based on Dr. King's care in the emergency room on
December 12, Dr. Baughman's care in the ICU on December 14, and Dr. Baughman's
supposed participation in the transfer decision. Separate but related allegations were
11

directed toward Dr. Healy, who undisputedly acted as an independent contractor, relating
to Shelly's delivery, care in the ICU, and the transfer decision. (Third Amended
Complaint.)
Plaintiffs produced one expert witness, Dr. DeVore, to address several different
areas of medical expertise, including emergency medicine, as directed toward Shelly's
care in the Hospital emergency room on December 12. Based on the district court's
pretrial ruling, the Hospital objected at trial to Dr. DeVore's proposed expert testimony
regarding alleged negligence in the Hospital emergency room, demonstrating through
voir dire that he lacked the requisite education, training, experience, and certification to
qualify as an expert in emergency medicine. The district court reaffirmed its prior ruling,
excluding Dr. DeVore's testimony regarding the emergency room standard of care. (Tr.
5004, Vol. II, at 381-88, 395-402, 456-61, Add. 61.) Because plaintiffs produced no
other witness regarding the emergency room standard of care or the breach of that
standard by the Hospital, the district court subsequently granted the Hospital's motion for
partial directed verdict as to alleged negligence in the emergency room only. (Tr. 5011,
Vol. IX, at 1788-92, 1798-1802, 1814-15, Add. 84; R. 4934-35, Add. 97.) The court
subsequently issued a jury instruction consistent with that ruling. (Instruction No. 31, R.
4904.)
On the remaining issues, defendants produced overwhelming evidence that their
care of Shelly Hipwell was well within the governing standards of care and had no effect
on Shelly's subsequent injury at the University Medical Center. For example, Dr.
12

DeVore himself testified that Shelly died from the heart puncture, and that all other
problems, including the liver rupture, had cleared up prior to her death. (Tr. 5005, Vol.
Ill, at 646-47.) He conceded that Shelly would be alive today but for the heart puncture.
(Tr. 5006, Vol. IV, at 728.) Defense expert Dr. James Martin, Professor and Chief of
Obstetrics at the University of Mississippi Medical Center, testified that in one-third of
the cases of HELLP Syndrome, symptoms do not manifest until after delivery. Only 1.5
percent of patients with the disease develop bleeding into the liver, and only one in
45,000 cases result in a ruptured liver. (Tr. 5009, Vol. VII, at 1359-65.) Dr. Joseph
Civetta, Chairman of Surgery at the University of Connecticut School of Medicine and
board certified in critical care, testified that Dr. Baughman's care was exemplary,
including correctly diagnosing a very rare disease. Dr. Civetta opined that earlier liver
surgery was not required and would not have changed the outcome, the liver rupture
could not have been prevented, and transfer to the University Medical Center was
appropriate. (Tr. 5010, Vol. VIII, at 1563-89.) Finally, Dr. Fred Millham, Associate
Director of the Surgical Intensive Care Unit at the Boston Medical Center, testified that
the sole cause of Shelly's brain damage was her heart puncture; no prior condition and
nothing defendants did contributed to that injury. (Tr. 5013, Vol. XI, at 2286-89.)
Based on all this evidence, the jury returned a special verdict finding no negligence
by either Dr. Healy or the Hospital in their care of Shelly Hipwell. Accordingly, the jury
did not reach the question of proximate causation. (R. 4930-31, Add. 100.) The district
court entered judgment on the special verdict. (R. 4939, Add. 103.) Plaintiffs appeal
13

from that final judgment, as well as from the pretrial order denying their motion to amend
and dismissing the fraud claims. (R. 4966-67.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' three fraud-related claims are directed toward the conduct of Dr. Healy.
The district court's rulings on those claims were clearly within the court's sound
discretion. However, those rulings may also be affirmed on the basis that the fraudrelated claims are rendered moot by the jury verdict of no underlying negligence.
Plaintiffs alleged fraudulent concealment of negligence; therefore, a finding of negligence
is a necessary predicate of the claim. Absent negligence, there can be no finding of
concealment. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims fail as a matter of law, and their requested
relief cannot be granted.
Exclusion of Dr. DeVore's testimony regarding the emergency room standard of
care was not an abuse of discretion because Dr. DeVore practices in a different medical
specialty. Moreover, plaintiffs failed to make a foundational showing that Dr. DeVore is
sufficiently knowledgeable about emergency room standards and procedures or that the
standards of care for an emergency physician and an obstetrician are the same. In any
event, plaintiffs failed to show that the emergency room physician was an agent of the
Hospital, or that admission of the emergency room testimony would have likely resulted
in a different verdict.
Finally, as an alternative basis to affirm judgment for the Hospital, plaintiffs'
claims against the Hospital remain barred by the two-year medical malpractice statute of
14

limitations. This Court previously ruled that Dr. Healy's alleged cover-up tolled the
statute of limitations on claims against him. However, the Court ruled that the statute was
not tolled as to claims against the Hospital unless plaintiffs proved on remand that Dr.
Healy was acting as agent and for the benefit of the Hospital. Plaintiffs failed to prove
those two points in the statute of limitations trial. Therefore, the statute of limitations was
not tolled as to claims against the Hospital, and now those claims are barred.
ARGUMENT
This case, sustained for over ten years by groundless allegations of negligence and
cover-up, is now fully exposed and finally played-out. Plaintiffs have had their "day in
court," their trial on the merits, and the jury found no negligence by Dr. Healy or McKayDee Hospital. Moreover, plaintiffs "concede that Dr. Healy and IHC presented sufficient
evidence . . . to support this verdict." (App. Br. 25.) Accordingly, instead of challenging
the jury verdict, plaintiffs contest four discretionary rulings of the district court on
pleading and evidence. Plaintiffs' first three arguments all pertain to alleged cover-up by
Dr. Healy. No such allegations are directed to the Hospital. The fourth argument pertains
to exclusion of expert testimony regarding the Hospital emergency room. However, none
of those four rulings was an abuse of discretion or affected the outcome of the trial.
The Hospital acknowledges the tragic and unfortunate outcome of Shelly
Hipwell's case. However, plaintiffs have already recovered for the negligence that
caused her brain injury and death, and if that recovery was not enough, they have also
recovered for the negligence or misconduct of their prior legal counsel in obtaining that
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recovery. Plaintiffs' effort to obtain additional money from Dr. Healy and the Hospital
for Shelly's same injury is unjust and has properly failed.
In addition, as an alternative basis to affirm the judgment for the Hospital, all
claims against the Hospital are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs failed to
comply with this Court's mandate in Jensen to prove Dr. Healy's agency in order to toll
the time for claims against the Hospital; therefore, those claims are barred. See, e.g.,
Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (this Court may affirm the district
court judgment on any legal ground apparent in the record).
POINT I: PLAINTIFFS5 THREE FRAUD-RELATED CLAIMS ARE RENDERED
MOOT BY THE JURY VERDICT OF NO UNDERLYING
NEGLIGENCE.
Having failed to prove negligence, and conceding the evidentiary support for the
verdict, plaintiffs necessarily strain to find other grounds for appeal. Plaintiffs now assert
that fraudulent concealment, rather than negligence, is "the heart" of their case. (App. Br.
at 4.) Plaintiffs' first three arguments on appeal all pertain to this supposed concealment
claim, including (1) dismissal of the fraud claim, (2) amendment of the fraud claim, and
(3) evidence of the fraud claim. The Third Amended Complaint directs this fraudulent
concealment claim only against Dr. Healy. (Third Amended Complaint, Second Cause of
Action.) Plaintiffs make no allegation that the Hospital participated in or knew of this
supposed cover-up, and plaintiffs exclude the Hospital from their defined group of
"Conspirators." (Third Amended Complaint, f 33.) Accordingly, the Hospital defers to
Dr. Healy to respond in full to these first three arguments and joins in his response brief
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on those points. Here, the Hospital merely offers a brief response to the fraud arguments
collectively, to the extent they may affect the Hospital indirectly.2
For ten years or more now, plaintiffs have kept this case alive with allegations
of fraudulent concealment of negligence. The implication was that defendants had done
something terrible to Shelly Hipwell and then covered it up to prevent discovery of their
negligence. Thus, fraudulent concealment was not asserted as a separate substantive
claim, or as a distinct basis for damages, but only as justification to toll the statute of
limitations on the'negligence claim. However, after prevailing in the statute of limitations
trial, plaintiffs then sought to amend their complaint, not to "clarify" the fraudulent
concealment claim, as they now deceptively assert (R. 2625), but to convert it into a
separate substantive claim. That attempt was weak because the proposed amended
complaint contained no separate allegations of fraudulent conduct and no claim of
2

Regarding the motion to amend, plaintiffs argue that they are merely complying with
this Court's mandate in Jensen to allege and prove agency so as to impute liability for Dr.
Healy's fraudulent conduct to the Hospital. (App. Br. 35.) This is a blatant distortion of
Jensen. First, this Court discussed agency and possible imputation of Dr. Healy's
conduct to the Hospital only for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations based on
fraudulent concealment. 944 P.2d at 338. Nowhere does the Court suggest, or authorize
a determination, that Dr. Healy is the Hospital's agent for purposes of liability, and
contrary to plaintiffs' assertion (App. Br. 35, n.3), no such interpretation is "obvious."
Plaintiffs had every opportunity to litigate this agency issue in the statute of limitations
trial, but purposely chose not to (R. 2044); therefore, plaintiffs have waived that argument
and cannot now be heard to complain that they were denied the chance to prove agency.
Second, as this Court acknowledged in Jensen, and as demonstrated in Dr. Healy's
response brief, plaintiffs have alleged no substantive fraud claim; therefore, no
amendment of the complaint is necessary to impute liability for that claim to the Hospital.
Accordingly, the proposed amendment was properly denied on the basis that it would
have contravened the law of the case, as established in Jensen. See Nelson v. Elway, 971
P.2d 245, 248-49 (Colo. App. 1998).
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damages resulting from fraudulent conduct. Plaintiffs' motion to amend prompted
defendants to file a motion to confirm that no separate fraud claim had been raised, as this
Court held in Jensen, supra, at 336-37. (R. 2665-75.)3 The district court agreed, denying
the motion to amend and granting the defense motion. (R. 2753-58.)
The district court ruling that plaintiffs had asserted no separate fraud claim
prompted plaintiffs to seek introduction of their fraud evidence by some other means,
filing a motion to introduce the concealment evidence as proof of negligence. (R. 366667.) However, the district court properly excluded such evidence at trial, as any slight
probative value on the issue of negligence was easily outweighed by danger of confusion
and unfair prejudice to both Dr. Healy and the Hospital, which was admittedly innocent
of any involvement in the alleged cover-up. See Utah R. Evid. 403.
While the district court rulings on these three fraud-related motions were plainly
within the court's sound discretion and did not likely affect the outcome, they may be
affirmed on the additional basis that the fraudulent concealment claim is now moot.
What plaintiffs allege was concealed is negligence, and now that the jury has found no
negligence, there can be no further claim of concealment. In short, it is now established
that nothing was actually concealed; therefore, it would serve no purpose now to amend
the complaint to augment the concealment claim, or to reinstate the concealment claim, or

3

Cases from other jurisdictions support this Court's holding in Jensen that no separate
claim for fraud exists when it is based only on concealment of underlying medical
malpractice. See, e.g., Bonin v. Vannaman, 929 P.2d 754, 764-65 (Kan. 1996); Rizkv.
Cohen, 535 N.E.2d 282, 286 (N.Y. 1989)
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to put on evidence of concealment. Because plaintiffs' requested relief on the three
motions would thus have no practical effect, the arguments are moot. See, e.g.,
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990) (statute of
limitations defense rendered moot by court decision holding the statute invalid); Badger
v. Madsen, 896 P.2d 20, 25 (Utah App. 1995) (claim moot because requested judicial
relief could not affect the rights of the parties).
Case law illustrates the futility and inconsistency of proceeding with a fraudulent
concealment claim after the underlying negligence claim is resolved. For example, in
Wurzberg v. Lapid, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12799 (D.N.Y. 1993), the plaintiffs alleged
medical malpractice in failing to remove a cancerous ovary and fraudulent concealment in
failing to disclose the negligence. Based on its finding of no negligence, the court
concluded that plaintiffs could assert no separate claim of fraudulent concealment:
[Maintenance of a fraud action against a physician for concealing substandard medical treatment necessarily involves a finding of malpractice.
Accordingly, the crux of plaintiffs' claims turns on whether [defendant] was
negligent....
Without a finding of negligence in the first instance,.. . plaintiffs lack
the requisite predicate for their fraudulent concealment claim. Only if
plaintiff can demonstrate that the operation was negligently performed must
the court reach the question of whether a subsequent failure to disclose this
negligence gives rise either to an independent action for fraud or to a toll to
the statute of limitations. [Id. at *10.]
Similarly, in Neuhaus v. DeCholnoky, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 161 (Jan. 19, 2000), a
medical malpractice action, the court held that fraudulent concealment is a "derivative
claim" that depends on the viability of the underlying claim. If the plaintiff fails to prove
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the underlying claim, the "derivative claim for fraudulent concealment... must also fail."
M a t * 15.
In summary, plaintiffs' three fraud-related arguments have no further viability in
view of the jury finding of no negligence. Absent negligence, there could be no
negligence cover-up; therefore, granting plaintiffs relief on their claims related to
pleading and proof of cover-up would be futile. Plaintiffs now lack the essential
predicate for their fraudulent concealment claim. Wurzberg, supra. Accordingly, the
district court rulings should be affirmed.
POINT II:

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
EXCLUDING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE EMERGENCY
ROOM STANDARD OF CARE BASED ON THE EXPERT'S
LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS.

Having lost on all other claims of negligence, plaintiffs now exaggerate the
claimed negligence in the Hospital emergency room, asserting in their fourth argument
that exclusion of their expert's testimony regarding the emergency room standard of care
altered the outcome of their case. (App. Br. 47-49.) However, the law and facts show no
abuse of discretion.
A,

Legal Principles Governing Expert Medical Witnesses.
Utah R. Evid. 702 provides that if "specialized knowledge will assist the trier of

fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." The party offering the expert witness has the burden of
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establishing sufficient foundation to show the witness' qualifications and expertise. E.g.,
Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248-49 (Utah 1985); Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337,
339 (Utah App. 1987). The trial court then has the duty and discretion to determine
whether the witness is adequately qualified and whether the expert testimony should be
admitted. E.g., Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22,26 (Utah 1999) (trial judge is the
"gatekeeper"); Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1326 (Utah App. 1993). As this Court
observed in Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Utah 1991):
"The trial court is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the admissibility of expert
testimony, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, this court will not reverse."
(Emp. added.) In reviewing a district court's exclusion of expert testimony at trial, this
Court gives deference to the district court's "advantageous position; thus, that court's
rulings regarding admissibility will not be overturned 'unless it clearly appears that the
lower court was in error.'" Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996) (emp.
added; citation omitted). Plaintiffs have shown no abuse of discretion.
In cases alleging medical malpractice against a physician, the plaintiff must
establish (1) the standard of care by which the physician's conduct is measured, (2)
breach of that standard (negligence), and (3) proximate causation of the claimed injury by
that negligence. E.g., Chadwickv. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah App. 1988). In
cases, such as the present, in which vicarious liability is alleged against a hospital for the
negligence of a physician practicing in the hospital, the plaintiff must also establish that
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the physician is the agent of the hospital, because hospitals do not practice medicine.
E.g., Tolman v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D. Utah 1986).
Because of the technical and specialized nature of medical care, "expert medical
testimony must be presented at trial in order to establish the standard of care." Chadwick,
supra, at 821. Moreover, "it is sound public policy to limit expert testimony in medical
malpractice cases to that which is within the doctor's specific field of practice." Id. at
822. As this Court held in the leading case of Burton v. Youngblood, supra:
It is true that, ordinarily, a practitioner of one school of medicine is not
competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice action against a
practitioner of another school. In light of the wide variation between
schools in both precepts and practices, as a general matter this rule makes
good sense. It has been judicially adopted in a majority of states, and we
follow it here. [711 P.2d at 248.]
See also Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993) ("Practitioners in one
specialty are not ordinarily competent to testify as experts on the standard of care
applicable in another specialty.55). Accordingly, an electrical engineer with expertise in
fluid mechanics is not qualified to give expert testimony regarding venous blood
transportation. Chadwick, supra, at 822. Neither is an ocular plastic surgeon qualified to
testify against a general plastic surgeon who performed eyelid surgery. Burton, supra, at
249.
This Court has recognized two exceptions to this general rule. An expert in one
medical specialty may testify regarding the standard of care in another specialty when the
expert is sufficiently "knowledgeable about the standard of care of another specialty or
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when the standards of different specialties on the issue in a particular case are the same."
Arnold v. Curtis, supra, at 1310. However, the proposed expert's foundational testimony
must reliably establish that the expert meets one of these exceptions. For example, in
Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 947-48 (Utah App. 1994), relied upon by plaintiffs here,
the court held that an emergency room specialist could not testify concerning the standard
of care of a cardiologist because the witness "failed to establish . . . that he had sufficient
knowledge regarding the appropriate standard of care prior to his review of the
documents," or "that the standard of care for emergency room physicians is the same as
for cardiologists." Similarly, in Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991),
the court upheld exclusion of expert testimony by a general practitioner against a
pediatrician because of inadequate foundation showing the expert's knowledge of the
alleged negligent course of action. Plaintiffs fail to satisfy either exception.
B.

Dr. DeVore Fails to Qualify As An Emergency Room Expert.
Plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. DeVore, is an obstetrician/gynecologist who

specializes in ultrasound examination of the fetus (perinatologist). He is admittedly not
an emergency room physician. Therefore, under the foregoing principles, Dr. DeVore is
not competent to testify regarding the emergency room standard of care, or the care
rendered by the emergency room physician, Dr. King, without a foundational showing
that he is sufficiently knowledgeable about the emergency room standard of care, or that
the standard of care for an obstetrician and an emergency room physician are the same.
See Burton and Arnold, supra. Plaintiffs have made no such showing.
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The Hospital initially challenged Dr. DeVore's qualifications to testify as an expert
witness nearly three years before the negligence trial. (R. 1697-1702.) The Hospital
moved to exclude Dr. DeVore's emergency room testimony in a motion in limine filed
March 9, 2001 (R. 3971), three weeks prior to trial. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion
(App. Br. 43), the district court did not deny this motion. While the court found Dr.
DeVore qualified to testify regarding other aspects of the case, the court conditionally
granted the motion as to the emergency room:
With specific regard, however, to testimony addressing Ms. Hipwell's
emergency room care, the Court finds Drs. DeVore and Schifirin are not
qualified to testify regarding her treatment during triage stages, specifically,
prior to her being diagnosed as needing obstetric care. Accordingly,
forgoing any new information regarding these doctors' qualifications, their
testimony will be limited in this manner. [R. 4558-69, emp. added.]
Accordingly, plaintiffs are disingenuous when they argue now that they were surprised by
the exclusion of Dr. DeVore's testimony at trial and lost credibility by asserting
emergency room negligence in their opening statement. (App. Br. 7, 50.) Knowing that
Dr. DeVore's qualifications to testify as an expert would be challenged at trial, plaintiffs
had ample opportunity to retain a qualified expert, but either decided against it, or were
unable find one.
At trial, when plaintiffs attempted to elicit Dr. DeVore's testimony regarding
knowledge of emergency room records, the Hospital appropriately objected and engaged
the witness in voir dire concerning his lack of emergency room experience and
qualifications. Dr. DeVore testified that emergency medicine is a board certified
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specialty; that he is not board certified in emergency medicine; that he has never sat for
the American College of Emergency Physicians ("ACEP") board certification, is not
qualified to seek such certification, and lacks sufficient training for emergency medicine
board certification; that the ACEP guidelines are different from the American College of
Gynecologists ("ACOG") guidelines; that he has never applied for privileges to work as
an emergency room physician; that he subscribes to no literature and takes no course in
emergency medicine; that his only article related to an emergency room was more than
ten years ago; and that his only work in an emergency room was as a resident at Yale,
more than 20 years ago, when the specialty of emergency room physician did not yet
exist* Dr. DeVore also conceded that he has no knowledge concerning guidelines for
liver function tests at the McKay-Dee emergency room, and that he had reviewed no
literature involving emergency room standard of care. Based on this testimony, the
district court sustained the objection. (Tr. 5004, Vol. II, at 381-88.)
4

Dr. DeVore testified:
Q When you worked in an emergency room, I think you told us back
at Yale, did the emergency department have a full blown emergency staff
much like LDS Hospital or Cottonwood or the University would have?
A The emergency room staff was-they did not have emergency
room physicians as we do today.
Q All right. So when you were working as a resident some 20 years
ago in emergency departments, since that time how emergency departments
are staffed, how they function, how they are trained is totally different,
correct?
A Yes. [Tr. 5004, Vol. II, at 385.]
25

When plaintiffs subsequently attempted to elicit Dr. DeVore's opinion on how Dr.
King should have responded to the information he obtained in the emergency room, the
Hospital again objected, and the district court sustained the objection: "[I]f he says it has
to be the emergency room physician who acts on it, that opinion is not going to be
allowed. Because in my opinion he has a lack of foundation on the emergency room."
(Id, at 399.) Dr. DeVore then testified regarding what is contained in the emergency
room and other Hospital records, and he was allowed to offer his opinion regarding
negligence in other aspects of Shelly's care. However, when he attempted to testify
regarding the emergency room standard of care, the district court again sustained the
Hospital's objection. ( M a t 461.)
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Dr. DeVore is sufficiently knowledgeable
about the emergency room standard of care to provide an expert opinion as to what
constitutes the applicable standard. Dr. DeVore testified that he has never worked in a
modern emergency room, and that his only experience is seeing his own patients come
through the emergency room. If that remote observation alone qualified him as an expert
on emergency medicine, any physician with patients who come through an emergency
room would qualify as an expert, contrary to this Court's rule in Burton and Arnold,
supra. "The mere fact that [a physician] has worked with .. . emergency room physicians
in the past does not by itself qualify him to render an expert opinion as to the standards of
care applicable to physicians who practice medicine in th[is] specialized field[]."
McKinney v. Schlatter, 692 N.E.2d 1045, 1052 (Ohio App. 1997). Dr. DeVore's
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emergency room experience many years ago is insufficient to qualify him as an
emergency medicine expert today. See Franklin v. Public Health Trust, 759 So. 2d 703,
705 (Fla. App. 2000) (general surgeon who formerly directed an emergency department
was properly excluded from testifying against an emergency room physician because he
"lacked substantial experience providing emergency medical services in a hospital
emergency department within the last five years")- Accordingly, the district court is not
obligated to accept Dr. DeVore's mere assertion that he knows the emergency room
standard of care when other compelling evidence calls that assertion into serious question.
Such a course "invites confusion, error, and a trial fraught with unreliable testimony."
Dikeou, supra, at 947.
Neither is Dr. DeVore in a position to know whether the emergency room standard
of care is the same as that for an obstetrician, like himself. The essence of plaintiffs'
negligence claim against Dr. King, the emergency room physician, is that he should have
diagnosed Shelly's rare condition and notified Dr. Healy so that her baby could have been
delivered one day sooner. (App. Br. 46-49.) However, Dr. DeVore conceded that ACEP
and ACOG guidelines are different, and that he is unfamiliar with the testing standards
and procedures in a modem emergency room. (Tr. 5004, Vol. II, at 383-86.) Moreover,
Dr. DeVore testified that, given the information available to the emergency room, he
would have delivered the baby. (Id. 422-23.) However, an emergency room physician is
not trained or expected to deliver babies; at most, his duty is to arrange for delivery by a
trained obstetrician, as indicated by test results and other circumstances. Thus, plaintiffs'
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allegation toward Dr. King is not that he should have delivered the baby, but that he
should have notified Dr. Healy to deliver the baby. Therefore, the standards of care for
an emergency room physician and an obstetrician are plainly not the same, and Dr.
DeVore lacks the familiarity with emergency room testing, procedures, and standards to
opine whether Dr. King met those standards in this case.
In any event, plaintiffs have failed to show that admission of Dr. DeVore's
emergency room testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial. The evidence
showed that Dr. King conducted extensive testing and found no indication of significant
disease; moreover, he did direct Shelly to follow up with her obstetrician, which she did
the very next morning. In addition, expert testimony at trial was compelling and credible
that Shelly's delivery was timely, and that delivery one day sooner would not have
affected Shelly's outcome. (Tr. 5009, Vol. VII, at 1374-81.) Additionally, given the fact
that the jury was not convinced by Dr. DeVore's testimony on other matters, there is no
substantial likelihood that the jury would have changed its verdict had he been permitted
to add his opinion regarding emergency room negligence. Accordingly, even if plaintiffs
could establish a "clear abuse of discretion," Rees, supra, they could not show that "the
excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict." Anton v. Thomas, supra, at 746; see Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros,, 20
Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279, 282 (1968) (evidentiary ruling is not cause for reversal unless

28

it had substantial bearing on the outcome of the trial). Therefore, the ruling should be
affirmed.5
Finally, as an alternative basis to affirm the district court's exclusion of Dr.
DeVore's testimony, plaintiffs failed to proffer any evidence that Dr. King is an agent of
the Hospital, an essential element of proof to establish Hospital liability. See Tolman v.
IHC Hospitals, Inc., supra; Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2). Absent any proffer of Dr. King's
agency, evidence of his negligence still would have resulted in a verdict of no liability
against the Hospital. Accordingly, plaintiffs are precluded from asserting on appeal that
the exclusion of evidence regarding emergency room negligence was improper or that
admission of the evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial. See, e.g.,
Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Utah 1980) (proffer must include the
agency relationship of person allegedly acting for the defendant); Downey State Bank v.
Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978) (absent required proffer,
appellant is precluded from asserting the alleged error on appeal). See also Arnold v.
Curtis, supra, at 1310 (affirming exclusion of expert medical testimony, challenged-for
lack of qualifications, on alternative basis that plaintiff failed to show proximate
causation).

5

Dr. DeVore's credibility was weakened, not only by his lack of experience and expertise on
the medical issues, as noted by the other experts (Tr. 5009, Vol. VII, at 1496; Tr. 5010, Vol.
VIII, at 1572-79), but by his involuntary termination from IHC in 1990, which resulted in
litigation with IHC and a substantial judgment and collection proceedings against him (Tr. 5006,
Vol. IV, at 742-49). See DeVore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1994). Based on
these past differences, the jury could easily have assumed Dr. DeVore's testimony was slanted
by personal bias.
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In summary, the district court's exclusion of Dr. DeVore's testimony concerning
the emergency room standard of care was proper, did not constitute a clear abuse of
discretion, and was not prejudicial on the record taken as a whole.
POINT III:

THIS ACTION IS TIME-BARRED AS TO THE HOSPITAL
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE THAT DR.
HEALY'S ALLEGED COVER-UP SHOULD BE IMPUTED TO
THE HOSPITAL.

In plaintiffs' prior appeal to this Court, as set forth in Jensen v IHC Hospitals, Inc.,
supra, the primary issue was whether plaintiffs' action was barred by the two-year statute
of limitations in U.C.A. § 78-14-4(1). In moving for summary judgment, defendants had
demonstrated without dispute that attorney Sharp, representing plaintiffs, knew of and
investigated possible negligence claims against Dr. Healy and the Hospital at least by
April of 1989. (R. 538, 549-50.) Because plaintiffs thus knew of their claim against
defendants more than two years before they filed their notice of intent on December 16,
1991, their action was barred by the statute of limitations. (R. 558-64.) The district court
granted summary judgment on that basis. (R. 1336-39.) On appeal, this Court
acknowledged that plaintiffs' "claims are barred by the statute of limitations, unless . . .
the statute was tolled for some reason." 944 P.2d at 332-33. The court then addressed
plaintiffs' allegations of fraudulent concealment by Dr. Healy and held that the
limitations period was necessarily tolled beyond Sharp's investigation to the investigation
by plaintiffs' substitute counsel, Forgette. Id. at 333-34. The issue prescribed for trial on
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remand was thus whether Forgette knew of a possible claim against defendants prior to
December 1989, more than two years before filing the notice of intent. Id. at 335.
Prior to remand, however, the Hospital filed a petition for rehearing, arguing that
the statute of limitations was not tolled as to claims against the Hospital because there
was no allegation or proof of Hospital involvement in the alleged cover-up. Id. at 337-38.
The Hospital cited Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1186-87 (Utah
1989), to show that summary judgment should be affirmed for medical providers, like the
Hospital here, not involved in alleged fraudulent concealment. This Court acknowledged
that the issue "whether Dr. Healy's alleged fraud can also act to toll the statute of
limitations as to McKay-Dee . . . [was] not discussed in our initial opinion." Jensen,
supra, at 338. The Court also agreed that generally fraud by one defendant in concealing
a cause of action will not toll the statute as to another defendant. Id.
Citing an exception to that rule, the Court explained that Dr. Healy's fraudulent
concealment could be imputed to the Hospital only based on "two factual findings: (i) that
Dr. Healy was McKay-Dee's agent; and (ii) that Dr. Healy acted . . . to further the aims of
McKay-Dee." Id. at 338. Even though "[t]he complaint makes no allegations regarding
these issues," id, the Court remanded to allow plaintiffs the opportunity to establish those
two facts. The Court instructed that if Dr. Healy is found to have acted as the Hospital's
agent and in furtherance of the Hospital's interests, then the statute of limitations is tolled
as to claims against the Hospital, and those claims are not barred. However, absent such
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findings, "then Dr. Healy's fraud does not toll the statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee
and [plaintiffs'] claims against McKay-Dee are barred." Id. (emp. added).
The effect of Jensen, then, was to remand one issue for determination of Dr.
Healy's statute of limitations defense, based on what attorney Forgette knew, id. at 335,
and a second, different issue for determination of the Hospital's statute of limitations
defense, based on whether Dr. Healy was the Hospital's agent in the alleged cover-up, id.
at 338.
On remand, the Hospital moved for summary judgment on the agency/benefit
issue, demonstrating that Dr. Healy was not its agent and that Healy's actions did not
further the Hospital's interests. (R. 1501-11.) See, e.g., Tolmany. IHC Hospitals, Inc.,
supra (physician with hospital staff privileges is not an agent of the hospital). Plaintiffs
opposed the motion, arguing that the agency issue must be reserved for the jury in the
statute of limitations trial. (R. 1566, 1578.) The district court denied the Hospital's
motion, expressly reserving the agency issue for trial. (R. 1887, 1893-94.)
However, the Hospital's agency issue was neyer tried in the statute of limitations
trial. Realizing they could not prove Healy's agency, plaintiffs embarked instead on a
strategy to lump both defendants into the same statute of limitations analysis, and thereby
keep the Hospital in the case without proof of agency. First, plaintiffs proposed a special
verdict form, which the district court approved, addressing only Forgette's knowledge,
without reference to the agency issue. (R. 1978-85,2013-15.) Second, plaintiffs filed a
motion in limine to exclude the issue of agency from the statute of limitations trial on the
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grounds that it was not relevant. (R. 2044-52.) The Hospital opposed that motion,
demonstrating that plaintiffs were attempting to escape their burden of proof on the
agency issue. (R. 2169-76.) However, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion,
excluding the issue of agency and limiting the focus of the statute of limitations trial to
the single question of what attorney Forgette knew, the question that disposed only of Dr.
Healy's limitations defense. (R. 2277-78.) The jury returned that limited verdict for
plaintiffs. (R.2423.)6
Following the statute of limitations verdict, plaintiffs proposed a judgment that
purported to be a final adjudication of the statute of limitations defense as to both
defendants. (R. 2433-34.) The Hospital objected to the proposed judgment, asserting
again its right to dismissal in the absence of proof of Dr. Healy's agency (R. 2435-40);
however, the district court denied relief and set the matter for trial against both
defendants. Accordingly, plaintiffs failed to establish Dr. Healy's agency, as this Court
directed was necessary to toll the time for claims against the Hospital.
Plaintiffs' course violated this Court's mandate in Jensen. A decision by this
Court establishes the law of the case as to all issues decided and is thereafter binding on
the parties and the lower court in all subsequent proceedings. See, e.g., Thurston v. Box
Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). "This serves the dual purpose of

6

As shown below, the Hospital had no burden of proof on the statute of limitations issues on
remand. Dr. Healy proposed a special verdict question on Forgette's knowledge, and the
Hospital joined in that proposal, expecting plaintiffs to propose a special verdict question on the
agency issue. (R. 1916.) However, plaintiffs successfully evaded the issue.
33

protecting against the reargument of settled issues and of assuring adherence of lower
courts to the decisions of higher courts." Id. at 1038. This Court's decision is conclusive
and controlling on the issues decided and may not be disregarded or subsequently
challenged, even if considered to be in error. Id. at 1038-39. See also Klinger v. Kightly,
889 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah App. 1995) (prior decision of supreme court on discovery rule
in statute of limitations case "is controlling as the law of this case"). Accordingly, this
Court's legal conclusion in Jensen that plaintiffs' "claims against McKay-Dee are barred"
absent proof of Dr. Healy's agency, id. at 338, is binding on the parties and the district
court in all subsequent proceedings. That unconditional conclusion established the
Hospital's prima facie statute of limitations defense, including the undisputed facts on
which it was based, and contemplated no additional proof or determination other than
whether Dr. Healy's cover-up should be imputed to the Hospital.
The burden of proving that Dr. Healy acted as agent and for the benefit of the
Hospital is on the plaintiffs. The plain language of Jensen, stated in the affirmative rather
than the negative, makes clear that the burden of proof is on plaintiffs: It requires proof
"that Dr. Healy was McKay-Dee's agent" and "acted . . . to further the aims of McKayDee," not that he was not an agent or did not act to benefit the Hospital. In Berenda v.
Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996), this Court held that once the defendant has
established the statute of limitations bar, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to avoid that bar
"by making a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that
given the defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the claim
34

earlier." 914 P.2d at 51. This language was cited in Jensen, supra, at 336. Berenda
added that "when the facts underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment are . ..
insufficiently established... the claim fails as a matter of law." 914 P.2d at 54 (emp.
added). See also McDougal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah App. 1997) (rejecting
fraudulent concealment claim as a matter of law because the plaintiff produced "no
evidence connecting [the defendant physician] with any concealment").
Accordingly, on remand, in order to toll the limitations period on claims against
the Hospital based on Dr. Healy's cover-up, plaintiffs were obligated to prove Dr. Healy's
agency and the benefit to the Hospital. However, plaintiffs failed in this burden of proof.
They affirmatively chose to avoid this burden by limiting the scope of the special verdict
and by filing a motion in limine to exclude the issue of agency. By choosing not to
address the agency issue in the statute of limitations trial, plaintiffs waived the issue and
cannot now assert it to defeat the Hospital's statutory bar. See, e.g., State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Utah 1996) (claim not argued in the district
court is "waived"). The result is that plaintiffs have produced "no evidence connecting"
the Hospital with Dr. Healy's alleged concealment. See McDougal, supra, at 179.
Therefore, the claim of fraudulent concealment against the Hospital is "insufficiently
established [and] fails as a matter of law." Berenda, supra, at 54.
In support of their motion in limine to exclude the issue of agency, plaintiffs cited
the case of Day v. Meek, 1999 UT 28, 976 P.2d 1202, construing it to preclude
consideration of fraudulent concealment prior to expiration of the four-year statute of
35

repose. Plaintiffs asserted that because fraudulent concealment was no longer relevant to
the statute of limitations, neither was agency. (R. 2045.) However, plaintiffs read the
case too broadly. In Day, the plaintiff filed a foreign-object claim just over one year after
discovery. The narrow issue was which limitations period applied, the general two-year
provision for all malpractice claims, or the one-year exception for discovery of foreign
objects. This Court held that the general two-year provision applied and that the one-year
foreign-object exception applied only to claims brought after the four-year repose period.
Id. f 22. Thus, Day is distinguishable because it construes the statutory one-year
exceptions in 78-14-4(1), while Jensen applies common law principles of fraudulent
concealment to toll the general two-year provision. Jensen, supra, at 336. As framed by
Jensen, neither statute of limitations issue required proof of fraudulent concealment on
remand, regardless of Day. Moreover, Day says nothing to change plaintiffs' burden of
proof on the separate issue of agency.
In summary, plaintiffs have waived their opportunity on remand to prove that Dr.
Healy acted as the Hospital's agent to toll the statute of limitations on claims against the
Hospital Therefore, the assertion of fraudulent concealment to toll claims against the
Hospital fails as a matter of law. Because "Dr. Healy's fraud does not toll the statute of
limitations as to McKay-Dee [plaintiffs'] claims against McKay-Dee are barred." Jensen,
supra, at 338.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the judgment of the district court
as to defendant McKay-Dee Hospital.
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Cite as 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997)

1. Statutes 5=^188, 223.2(.5), 223.4
Sherry JENSEN and Shayne Hipwell, individually and on behalf of all other heirs
of Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley Michele
Hipwell and Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell
appearing by Shayne Hipwell as guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs, Appellants, and
Cross-Appellees,
v.
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKay-Dee
Hospital, and Michael J. Healy, M.D.
and Does I through X, Defendants, Appellees, and Cross-Appellant
No. 950164.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 4, 1997.
Opinion Granting Rehearing
Aug. 22, 1997.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 25, 1997.

When faced with two statutes that purport to cover same subject, Supreme Court
determines legislature's intent as to which
statute applies by following general rules of
statutory construction, which provide^ both
that best evidence of legislative intent is
plain language of statute and that more specific statute governs instead of more general
statute.
2. Physicians and Surgeons ^18.15
Two-year statute of limitations governing medical malpractice actions covered action by patient's family for wrongful death
ansmg out of medical malpractice. U.C.A.
1953, 78-14-4.
3. Death <s=>39
Statute of limitations applicable "to
wrongful death claims ansmg out of medical
malpractice begin to run at time patient or
plaintiff discovers or, through use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
injury, whichever first occurs. U.C.A.1953,
78-14-4.

Patient's family sued physician and 'hospital for wrongful death arising out of medical malpractice. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake Division I, * Glenn Iwasaki, J.,
granted summary judgment for defendants 4. Death e=>39
on limitations grounds. Family appealed.
Absent any reason to toll two-year statThe Supreme Court, Zimmerman, C.J.., held ute of limitations governing deceased pathat: (1) wrongful death claims were, gov- tient's medical malpractice claims, patient's
erned by two-year statute of limitations for family could not bring survival claim, where
medical malpractice actions; (2> limitations statute had run by time patient died. U.CA
penod began running when plaintiffs discov- 1953, 78-11-12, 78-12-37, 78-14-4.
ered, or should have discovered, underlying
injury; (3) genuine issue of fact as to wheth- 5. Judgment <3>181(7)
er physician's fraudulent concealment tolled
Genuine issue of fact as to whether phystatute of limitations precluded summary sician's alleged fraudulent concealment prejudgment; (4) patient's children were not vented patient's family from mquinng into
entitled to bring wrongful death claim such possibility of medical malpractice on part of
that they were not entitled to provisions of physician and hospital precluded summary
tolling statute, on motion for rehearing; (5) judgment in favor of physician and hospital
genuine issues of fact existed as to whether on statute of limitations grounds m family's
physician's alleged fraudulent concealment wrongful death action ansmg out of medical
could be impute to hospital so as to toll malpractice. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-4.
limitations period on claim against hospital;
and (6) family did not present evidence to 6. Death €=39
support constructive fraud claim against hosDeceased patient's minor children were
pital, and thus such a claim could not toll
not entitled to bring action for wrongful
limitations penod
death because patient had appointed guardAffr
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from running on children's' claims1* against
physician and hospital for wrongful death
arising out of medical malpractice. U.C.A.
1953, 78-11-7, 78-12-36, 78-14-4.

11. Fraud ®=>7,16
Constructive fraud requires confidential
relationship between parties and failure^ to
disclose material facts.

7. Fraud e=>38

12. Limitation of Actions ^197(2)
Patient's family failed to present evidence to support constructive fraud claim
against hospital, based on claim that a hospital physician failed to disclose that he had
committed medical malpractice in treating
patient, and thus constructive fraud could not
be used to toll statute of limitations on family's medical malpractice claims against hospital, where family did not present evidence to
contradict physician's deposition testimony
that patient received exemplary care.
U.C.A.1953, 78-14-4.

Patient's family's claim of fraudulent
concealment of medical malpractice was governed by two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations, even though complaint alleged common-law fraud; common-law fraud
allegations surrounded fraudulent concealment claim that physician acted to divert
family's attention away from "his alleged malpractice. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-4.
8. Limitation of Actions @=>104(1)
"Fraudulent concealment doctrine"" is
mechanism whereby plaintiff can avoid full
operation of discovery rule by making prima
facie shoeing of fraudulent concealment and
then demonstrating that given defendant's
actions, reasonable plaintiff,would not have
discovered claim earlier.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

On Petition for Rehearing
9. Limitation of Actions @=>104(1)
Generally, fraud committed by thirdf party in concealing a cause of action against
another defendant will- not toll statute of
limitations as to that defendant; however,
where there is agency or privity relationship
between third party committing fraud and
defendant, liability for third party's fraud can
be imputed to defendant if third party acts
whole or in part to carry out purposes of
defendant,.
10. Judgment <^181(7)
Genuine issues of fact as to whether
physician was hospital's agent and whether
physician acted in whole or in part to further
aims of hospital when he allegedly colluded
with attorneys to conceal medical malpractice
action precluded summary judgment action
fnv Wmfal on staiute of limitations grounds

Richard D. Burbidge, Stephen B. Mitchell,
Gary R. Johnson, Salt Lake City, and Simon
H. Forgette, Kirkland, WA, for plaintiffs.
James W. Gilson, Kathy A. Lavitt, Salt
Lake City, for IHC.
Elliott J. Williams, Kurt M. Frankenburg,
Salt Lake City, for Dr. Healy.
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
The trial court granted summary judgment
for defendants IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba
McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay-Dee"), and
Michael J. Healy, M.D. ("Dr. Healy"), ruling
that plaintiffs Sherry Jensen and Shayne
Hipwell's action was barred by the medical
malpractice statute of limitations, section 7814-4 of the Utah Code. Jensen and Hipwe!l
appealed the grant of summary judgment
under section 78-2-2(3)0) of the Utah Code.
We reverse and remand to the trial court for
resolution of a fact question relevant to the
tolling of the statute of limitations.
A detailed recitation of the facts is necessary to understand the complex legal issues
presented by this appeal. " 'Before we recite
the facts, we note that in reviewing a grart
of summary judgment, we view the facts and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom m
the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party'" K & T, Inc v Koroulis 888 P.2d
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Because _McKay-Dee and Dr. Healy moved
for summary judgment, we state the facts in
the light most favorable to. Jensen and Hipwell
Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell are,
respectively, the surviving mother and husband of Shelly Hipwell. They seek to recover for Shelly's wrongful death on behalf of
themselves and as legal guardians of Shelly's
two minor daughters (collectively "Shelly's
family"). On December 12, 1988, the' day
before a scheduled induced delivery of her
second daughter, Shelly experienced severe'
abdominal pain and went to the emergency
room of McKay-Dee Hospital. After being
sent home, Shelly returned to McKay-Dee
on December 13th for a caesarian delivery of
her baby. Shelly experienced various complications at McKay-Dee after the delivery,
Which Shelly's family claims were the result
of malpractice and negligence on the part of
McKay-Dee and Dr. Healy, Shelly's obstetrician. Ofi December 23rd, Shelly was transferred to the University of Utah Hospital for
further treatment. At University Hospital,
Shelly suffered anoxic brain damage after a
Resident physician punctured her heart with
3. biopsy needle, leaving her in a coma, totally
and permanently disabled. Shelly subsequently died some three and a half years
later, on May 27, 1992.
In early 1989, while Shelly was at University Hospital in a coma, Dr. Healy discussed
Shelly's case with his brother, attorney Tim
Healy. After this discussion, attorney Healy
had discussions with the Healys' sister, Diane DeVries. In the course of those discussions, attorney Healy asked DeVries to call
Shelly's family and recommend attorney
Roger Sharp, a Salt Lake attorney who specialized in medical malpractice cases. DeVries had known Shelly's family for some time,
DeVries contacted Shelly's family but did not
tell them that the Healys were her brothers,
nor did she tell them that she was also Dr.
Healy's file clerk. Shelly's family retained
attorney Roger Sharp on February 10, 1989,
!• This court struck down the statutory cap on
medical malpractice damages as unconstitutional
on* May 1, 1989, in Condemann v University
Hospital 775 P2d 34S (Utah 1989), approxi*h"17itplv
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to represent Shelly in a medical malpractice
case. Three days later, attorney Healy
wrote to attorney Sharp, confirming a feesplitting arrangement Shelly's family was
not aware of attorney Healy's involvement in
the case or of Diane DeVries' relationship
with Dr. Healy and attorney Healy. The
letter from attorney Healy to attorney Sharp
makes clear that attorney Healy was communicating with Dr. Healy about attorney
'Sharp's investigation and implies that attorney Sharp's investigation of Dr. Healy's
treatment was to be minimal.
As part of his investigation, attorney Sharp
sent a document request to Dr. Healy, seeking "a copy of all medical records regarding
[Shelly] Hipwell." Dr. Healy did not produce a copy of all medical records, but instead produced a selective set of documents
that he personally reviewed. Attorney
Sharp never received a copy of Shelly's complete medical records from Dr. Healy. By
letter, attorney Sharp also requested a copy"
of Shelly's complete medical records from
McKay-Dee Hospital. However, he subsequently orally limited that request and ultimately received only limited medical records
from McKay-Dee. On May 6,1989, attorney
Shaj-p and Shelly's family settled her case
against University Hospital for $250,000, the
amount of the previously effective statutory
cap on damages against the University.1
In mid-1989, Shelly was transferred from
McKay-Dee Hospital, to which she had returned from University Hospital on April 14,
1989, to the Greenery, a rehabilitation facility
in Washington State. Carol Pederson, a social worker at the Greenery, contacted attorney Simon Forgette on August 10, 1989, to
request that he provide an opinion of the
settlement in Shelly's case and evaluate the
conduct of her attorneys in settling the case.
At that time, Forgette's memos to the file
regaining the possible new case indicate that
Forgette understood that Shelly's liver had
been lacerated during her caesarian delivery
at McKay-Dee. On August 29th, Forgette
ty- Attorney Sharp knew of our decision in
Condemann when the settlement was agreed to,
and his actions in that case have been the subject
of litigation See Hipwell v. Shaip, 858 P.2d 987
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contacted Pederson, who assured him that
she had the family's permission to discuss
Shelly's case. , She identified Sharp as Shelly's Utah attorney. That same day, Pederson wrote a letter to Forgette in which she
stated, "Ms. Jensen [Shelly's mother] has
requested you to offer an opinion on the
settlement reached in this case, and advise
the family regarding any further legal action
which might be indicated." On September
18th, Forgette reviewed medical records provided by Pederson and asked that she arrange for a meeting with Ms. Jensen, Shelly's mother. His understanding at that time
was still that Shelly's liver had been lacerated at McKay-Dee. Forgette's memo to his'
file also indicates that he needed to determine "the statute of limitations on bringing
any claim against hospitals or against attorneys."
On October 19, 1989, Ms. Jensen, Shelly's
mother, traveled to Washington and met with
Forgette to discuss Shelly's case. Ms. Jensen orally retained Forgette on .this date and
Forgette was to request a copy of attorney
Sharp's file. Forgette's memo to the file at
this time indicates that he was working with
a Utah attorney who was doing some, background investigations regarding Shelly's case
and the settlement with University Hospital
This attorney wanted to "remain in the background" because he had worked with attorney Sharp in the past and received a signifi2.

Section 78-14-8 of the Utah Code provides that
a medical malpractice action may not commence
"unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant .. at least ninety days' prior
-notice of intent to commence an action " If the
filing of the notice of intent comes Itss than 90
days before the end of the limitations period for
filing a medical malpractice action, the limitation period "shall be extended to 120 days from
the date of service of notice." Id.
Further,
within 60 days of filing a notice of intent, the
plaintiff must submit a request for prelitigation
panel review. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-1412(l)(c)(2)(a). But see Gramhch v. Munsey, 838
P.2d 1131 (Utah 1992) (holding that action may
not be dismissed for failure to file request for
prelitigation review within 60 days of notice of
intent). That section also provides that upon
filing a request for prelitigation review, the statute of limitations is tolled until 60 days after the
prelitigation panel issues its opinion. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-12(3)
We note that Shelly's family filed its notice of

cant amount^ of business/ from McKay-Dee.
The memo to the file also indicates that, after
meeting with Shelly's mother, Forgette's understanding was that Shelly's liver "had been
either damaged or had burst" while she was
at McKay-Dee. On October 20th, Forgette
wrote to Sharp requesting a copy of his file
on Shelly. By December 14th, Ms. Jensen
still had not signed a formal retainer and
Forgette had still not received Sharp's file.
On that date, Forgette drafted a retainer
agreement to send to Ms. Jensen, which provided that Forgette was to handle claims
against McKay-Dee Hospital, University
Hospital, Roger Sharp, attorney Healy
and/or others. On December 26th, Forgette
received a portion of Sharp's file, but he did
not receive the entire file until February 15,
1990. In the meantime, the present plaintiffs, Ms. Jensen and Shayne Hipwell (Shelly's husband), signed Forgette's written retainer agreement on January 17,1990.
"When Forgette received Sharp's file on
February 15th, he learned of attorney Healy's involvement in the case and learned that
Sharp's file did' not contain a complete set of
medical records from Dr. Healy or McKayDee Hospital. Forgette did not file a notice
of intent to commence suit in the instant case
against McKay-Dee Hospital and Dr. Healy
until almost two years later, on December 16,
1991.2 Shelly Hipwell died on May 27, 1992,
lawsuit until July 29, 1992, more than 120 days-,
after filing the notice of intent. Both parties
before this court briefed the issues as if December 16, 1989, the date two years before the filing
of the notice of intent, was the relevant date for
statute of limitations purposes. We can only
assume that Shelly's family's failure to file its
lawsuit within 120 days of that date was due to
their having filed a request for prelitigation review and waiting for the panel's decision. However, we find no indication of this in the record.
If Shelly's family did not file a prelitigation review request, the filing of the lawsuit more than
120 days after the filing of the notice of intent
may be fatal to the entire suit. See Milieu v.
Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980)
(holding that where notice of intent was filed less
than 90 days before running of limitations period
and lawsuit was not filed within 120 days of
filing notice of intent, suit was properly dismissed). We do not address this issue because it
was not presented to us.
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and Forgette filed the complaint in this suit
on July 29,1992
After allowing the parties to complete discovery, the trial court granted summary
judgment to Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee on
February 21, 1995, ruling that the two-year
statute of limitations governing medical malpractice actions contained in section 78-14-4
of the Utah Code had run by December of
1991, when Forgette filed his notice of intent.
On appeal, Shelly's family makes a series of
arguments, which are summarized below.

allowed to proceed on their separate claims
for common law fraud, which are governed
by a three-year statute of limitations. -We
reject both claims.
Returning in. depth to Shelly's family's
first argument concerning the statute of limitations that applies to their wrongful death*
claims: Shelly's family reasons that because
this is a claim for wrongful death, section 7812-28(2) of the Code, which governs wrongful
death, is the applicable statute of limitations,"
rather than the Medical Malpractice Act statute of limitations contained in section 78-144, as the trial court held. Shelly's family
further argues that the two-year limit in the
wrongful death statute does not begin to run
until the decedent's death.

First, Shelly's family contends that the
wrongful death statute of limitations, section
78-12-28(2) of the Code, applies to their
wrongful death claims. They argue that
their claims cannot be barred until two years
after Shelly's death because the wrongful
[1] When we are faced with two statutes
death statute of limitations does not begin to
run until the decedent's death. In the alterr that purport to cover the same subject, we
native, they argue that if the medical mal- seek to determine the legislature's intent as
practice statute of limitations contained in to which applies. In doing this, we follow the
section 78-14-4 of the Code applies in case$ general rules of statutory construction, which
of wrongful death due to medical malpractice, provide both that "the best evidence of legisthe two-year period it contains should, not lative intent is the plain language of the
begin to run until the decedent's death. We statute," Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853
P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 1993) (citing Jensen v.
reject both these claims.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d
Second, Shelly's family asserts that the
903, 906 (Utah 1984)), and that "'a more
running of the statute of limitations .on^ both
specific statute governs instead of a more
Shelly's personal urjury claims (which surgeneral statute.' " De Baritault v. Salt Lake
vived her death and are now asserted by her
City Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 748 (Utah 1996)
family) and their wrongful death, claims
(quoting Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d
should be tolled because of Dr. s Healy's al1142, 1145 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted)).
leged fraudulent concealment of the facts
In this case, the Medical Malpractice Act's
upon which their claims are grounded. The
plain language indicates a legislative intent to
trial court ruled that Shelly's family's oral
have the statute apply to claims such as the
retention of attorney Forgette on October 19,
ones Shelly's family seeks to bring.
1989, more than two years before the filing of
the notice of intent, "demonstrated that For[2] The Utah Health Care Malpractice
gette was in possession of facts whereby he Act specifically provides, "No malpractice acknew or should have known that [Shelly] tion . . . may be brought unless it is comHipwell's condition was caused or possibly menced within two years after the plaintiff or
caused by negligence on the part of McKay- patient discovers ... the injury.". Utah
Dee Hospital and Dr. Healy." We conclude Code Ann. § 78-14-4. The Act defines "malthat this is a disputed issue of fact -that' practice actions" to which the Act was inprecludes summary judgment.
tended to apply as "any action against a
Third, Shelly's family argues that Shelly health care provider, whether in contract,
Hipwell's minor children should be allowed to tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or
proceed with claims for wrongful death be- otherwise, based upon alleged personal injucause the children's minority tolled the stat- ries relating to or arising out of health care
r,V „1J
ute of limitations « tn thpir rlsimQ T act •v-nnrfciYx- /•
A

332

Utah

944 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

§ 78-14-3(14) (emphasis added). Clearly, County, 784 P.2d, 1152, 1155 (Utah 1989)
the legislature intended that the Utah Health (comparative negligence). The question here
Care Malpractice Act apply to actions for is whether we should separate the death
wrongful death based upon personal injuries from the causative wrong sufficiently to perarising out of medical malpractice. Further, mit a wrongful death action where the decethis statute is more specific than the general dent's personal injury cause of action had
wrongful death statute of limitations, apply- been barred at the time of d$ath. f We deing as it does only to wrongful death actions cline to adopt such a rule.
arising out of medical malpractice. Therefore, we hold that the two-year statute of
[3,4] As one of the foremost authorities
limitations governing medical malpractice acon the law of torts has observed, the ratiotions covers this action for wrongful death
nale underlying the rule barring the heirs
arising out of medical malpractice.
from bringing a wrongful death suit after the
Shelly's family next argues that if the med- injured patient has brought suit on the unical malpractice statute of limitations governs derlying personal injury action is that "the
their claims for wrongful death, the event injured individual is not merely a conduit for
that begins the running of the statute is the the support of others, he is master of his own
decedent's death. The medical malpractice claim and he may settle the case or win or
statute of limitations provides that a medical lose a judgment on his own injury even
malpractice action must be brought "within though others may be dependent upon him."
two years after the plaintiff or patient discov- W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton
ers, or through the use of reasonable dilion the Law of Torts § 127, at 955 (5th ed.
gence should have discovered the injury."
1984). The majority of states refuses to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1) (emphasis addallow a decedent's heirs to proceed with a
ed). Shelly's family argues that the "injury"
wrongful death suit after the decedent has
in a wrongful death case arising1 out of medical malpractice is not the malpractice itself settled Ms or her personal injury case or won
but is, rather, the death. They argue that or lost a judgment before dying. Id. Given
because there can be no cause of action for the underlying rationale, and 'given that the
wrongful death until death occurs, the stat- core purpose of any statute of limitations is'
ute of limitations on their claims cannot be- to compel exercise of a right within a reasonable time to avoid stale claims,' loss of evigin to run until Shelly's death.
dence, and faded memories, Horton v. GoldWe have held that an action for wrongful'
miner's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah
death is an independent action accruing in
1989), we see no reason to impose a different
the heirs of the deceased, Van Wagoner v.
rule regarding the'heirs' maintenance of a
Union Pac. R.R., 112 Utah 189,186 P.2d 293,
wrongful
death suit where ari injured patient
303 (1947). This is conceptually compatible
with Shelly's family's assertion of a right to has chosen to let the statute of limitations
proceed independent of any analysis of Shel- run on the underlying personal injury claim
ly's predeath rights against her physicians. rather than settling or litigating the claim.
However, we have not entirely separated the Therefore, we hold that in wrongful death
heirs' right from the decedent's because the claims arising out of medical malpractice, the
heirs' right is in major part based on rights applicable statute of limitations is section 78of support, both financial and emotional, that 14-4 of the Code, and the statute^ begins to
run to them from the deceased. According- run at the time the "patient discovers or,
ly, we have held that the wrongful death through the use ,of reasonable diligence
cause of action is based on the underlying should have discovered the injury, whichever
wrong done to the decedent and may only first occurs," meaning the time the patient
proceed subject to at least some of the de- discovers or should have discovered the medfenses that would have been available against ical malpractice injury. Thus, Shelly's famin e wrongful death claims are barred by the
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below, the statute was tolled for some reason.3
Notwithstanding the two-year statute of
limitations governing their claims, Shelly's
family argues that they are entitled to maintain these actions because the statute of limitations was tolled by Dr. Healy and attorney
Healy's fraud sufficiently long that attorney
Forgette's notice of intent was timely. Disposition of this claim requires a rather indepth discussion of the complex law of fraudulent concealment.
Fraudulent concealment requires that one
with a legal duty or obligation to communicate certain facts remain silent or otherwise
act to conceal material facts known to him.
37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud & Deceit § 145 (1968).
Such a duty or obligation may arise from a
relationship of trust between the parties, an
inequality of knowledge or power between
the parties, or other attendant circumstances
indicating reliance. Id The party's silence
must amount to fraud, i.e., silence under the
circumstances must amount to an affirmation
that a state of things exists which does not
exist, and ' the • uninformed party must be
deprived to the same extent as if a positive
assertion had been made. Id Such "[concealment or nondisclosure becomes fraudulent only when there is an existing fact or
condition . . . which the party charged is
under a duty to disclose." Id Making use
of a device that misleads, some trick or contrivance that is intended to exclude suspicion
and prevent inquiry, may also amount to
Shelly's family also argues that they are entitled to proceed with Shelly's personal injury/medical malpractice claims as her personal
representatives and/or heirs under the survival
statutes. The survival statutes provide that a
deceased person's personal injury action does
not abate when that person dies, but rather survives the person's death and may be brought by
the deceased's personal representatives or heirs.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12. However, if
the person has not brought suit before her death,
her personal representatives or heirs may bring
suit only if the person died before the time allowed for bringing suit had expired, and then
they must bring suit within one year of the person's death. See id § 78-12-37.

fraudulent concealment. Id It is this aspect of fraudulent concealment that is at
issue in the instant case.
Applying the facts of Shelly's case to these
requirements, Shelly's < family's argument
must run as follows: (i) Dr. Healy was in a
position of superior knowledge and was the
beneficiary of Shelly's and her family's trust;
(ii) this superior knowledge and position of
trust created a duty to disclose material facts
regarding Shelly's care; (iii) Dr. Healy knew
of his brother's involvement with attorney
Sharp and knew of the cursory nature of
attorney Sharp's investigation but did not
disclose these facts to Shelly's family or,
alternatively, concealed them from Shelly's
family to divert attention from his alleged
malpractice; (iv) Dr. Healy knew that Shelly's family would rely on attorney Sharp's
investigation to uncover any malpractice on
his part, thus creating a duty on his part to,
disclose the facts of his association with at-f
torneys Healy and Sharp; (v) in this manner,
Dr. Healy used his position of influence with
his brother and attorney Sharp to divert
Shelly's family's attention away from his care
of Shelly, thereby preventing them from'discovering the facts constituting the alleged
malpractice.
Once this argument is reduced to its basic
elements, it is clear that attorney Sharp's
investigation cannot be used to start the
statute of limitations running against Shelly's
claims.4 What is not as clear is whether Dr.

3.

Absent any reason to toll the statute, the twoyear statute of limitations governing Shelly Hipwell's
medical
malpractice/personal
injury
claims, section 7S-14—4, had run by the time she

allowed for doing so had expired, her personal
injur}' cause of action did not survive her death,
and thus her family cannot bring a survival
claim.
4.

Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee argue that attorney
Sharp's investigation of Dr. Healy and M c K a y Dee Hospital in early 1989 triggered the statute
of limitations as to medical malpractice claims
against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. We decline
to follow this logic on the facts as they are
presented to us. While under general principles
of agency law, the knowledge of an agent is to be
imputed to the principal, it is well established
that, where the agent has interests in the transac-'
tion adverse to the principal's, or where the
agent colludes with third parries whose interests
are adverse to the principal's interests, knowledge of the facts at issue will not be imputed to
the principal. See 3 Am Jur.2d Agency § 290
(1986) In the instant case, attorney Sharp's fee-
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Healy's alleged fraudulent concealment was
sufficient to continue tolling the statute of
limitations once Shelly's family retained attorney Forgette in the fall of 1989. As noted
above, Shelly's family contends that they had
no facts that could have led them to suspect
malpractice by Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee
until February of 1990, when they discovered
the relationships among Dr. Healy, attorney
Healy, Diane DeVries, and attorney Sharp.
In contrast, Dr. Healy contends that attorney
Forgette considered Dr. Healy and McKayDee as potential defendants in a medical
malpractice suit on Shelly Hipwell's behalf as
early as December 14, 1989, as evidenced by
his retainer agreement prepared on that
date, which included references to Dr. Healy
and McKay-Dee. Shelly's family presented
attorney Forgette's affidavit as evidence that
he included Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee in his
retainer agreement with Shelly's family
merely to "cover all the bases" but was retained solely to investigate legal malpractice
on the part of attorney Sharp in* settling
Shelly's claims against University Hospital
for her punctured heart.

o ^ ^

The error committed here directly parallels that made by the trial court in Berenda
v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996). In
Berenda, we specifically stated:
The application of this legal rule [of fraudulent concealment] to any particular set of
facts is necessarily a matter left to trial
courts and finders of fact
[W]e explicitly acknowledge that weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct in
light of the defendant's steps to conceal
the cause of action necessitates the type of
factual findings which preclude summary
judgment in all but the clearest of cases.
Thus, summary judgment is appropriate
only when the facts fall on two opposite
ends of a factual continuum: either (i)
when the facts are so clear that reasonable
persons could not disagree about the underlying facts or about the application of
the governing legal standard to the facts
or (ii) when the facts underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment are so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently established
that they fail to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to concealment, with the
result that the claim fails as a matter of
law.

The'trial court made what amounts to a
mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law on
disputed evidence, to * wit, that Forgette's'
"oral retention of October 19, 1989 clearly
demonstrated that Forgette was in posses- Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53-54. In that case,, we
sion of facts whereby he knew or should have held that the plaintiffs letters to his partknown that [Shelly] Hipwell's condition was ner/defendant reflecting the plaintiffs suspicaused or possibly caused by negligence on cion that the partner was misappropriating
the part of McKay-Dee Hospital and Dr. partnership assets were insufficient to underHealy." (Emphasis added.) This finding lie a trial court finding that the plaintiff was
and conclusion is inappropriate on a motion under a duty to make inquiries, which would
for summary judgment. "Summary judg- have led to discovery of the cause of action.
ment is appropriate only when no genuine Id. We found that the letter equally supissues of material fact exist and the moving ported the plaintiffs contention that he
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of voiced his suspicions in the letters in an
law." K & T, Inc., 888 P.2d at 626-27 (citing attempt to find out if the company "was
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins, 855 P.2d at really broke." Id. We said that "while it
235). " We determine ... whether the trial may be 'a close call,' . . . we cannot agree
court . . . correctly held that there were no that, as a matter of law, the two letters
disputed issues of material fact.' " Id. (quot- demonstrate that [plaintiff] should have susing Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151.(Utah pected [defendant's] wrongdoing or, more importantly, that an inquiry would reasonably
1989);. Here, the trial court erred.
implication in attorney Healy's letter to attorney
Sharp that Sharp's investigation of Dr. Healy's
care of Shelly was to be minimal indicate that
1
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verse to Shelly Hipwell's. Therefore, his investigation of Dr. Healy and his consideration of Dr.
Healy and McKay-Dee as potential defendants m
a malpractice action cannot be used to start the
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have led to discovery of the misapplication." Id. at 55.
[5] The issue before the trier of fact in
this case is whether attorney Forgette discovered or reasonably should have discovered the legal injury done to Shelly Hipwell
before December 16, 1989. In other words,
the jury must determine whether the facts in
this case indicate that Dr. Healy's fraudulent
concealment somehow prevented Shelly's
family, who, by retaining attorney Forgette,
had defeated the collusion of Dr. Healy with
his brother and attorney Sharp, from inquiring into the possibility of medical malpractice
on the part of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee.
The question becomes: Would a reasonable
attorney, presented with the facts that attorney Forgette knew in December of 1989,have considered investigating a medical mal-'
practice case against Dr. Healy and McKayDee? This is a genuine issue of material
fact, which precludes summary judgment in
this case. Therefore, we remand to the trial
court on this issue, the outcome of which' will
determine'whether Shelly's family is entitled'
to proceed on both their survival claims and*
their wrongful death claims.
Shelly's family's next argument is that
even though the statute of limitations bars
the adult plaintiffs, Shelly's children were,
minors at the time of her injury and death
and, therefore, section 78-12-36, the tolling,
statute, came into play and prevented the
statute of limitations from running on their
claims against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee.
[6] This argument fails because the chil-'
dren's situation does not fit within the tolling
statute's terms. Section 78-12-36 provides,
"If a person entitled to bring an action ... is
at the time the cause of action accrued, [i]
either under the age of minority or mentally
incompetent and [ii] without a legal guardian,
the time of the disability is not a part of the
time limited for the commencement of the
action." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (bracketed material added). Shelly's children were
not entitled to bring an action for wrongful
death because Shelly had an appointed
5. A separate question we do not address is
whether the tolling statute would have applied to

JLi1V«
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guardian at the time of her death.5 The
wrongful death statute provides:
When the death of a person not a minor is
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another, his heirs, or his personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may
maintain an action for damages against the
person causing the death
, If such
adult person has a guardian at the time of
his deat)\ only one action can be'maintained for the injury to or'death of such
person, and such action may be brought by
either the personal representatives of such
adult deceased person, for the benefit of
his heirs, or by such guardian for the
benefit of the heirs
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (emphasis added). The statute thus clearly provides that if
a guardian has been appointed, only the personal representative or guardian may bring
suit and the heirs are no longer entitled to
maintain an action. • In this case, Shayne*
Hipwell and Sherry Jensen were appointed
as Shelly's guardians. Under the statute's,
plain language, Shelly's children were not
entitled to bring an action for her wrongful
death, and the tolling statute becomes irrelevant as the children had no claims.
1

[7] As a final argument,' Shelly's family
seeks to avoid the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations by bringing their
claim within the three-year fraud statute of
limitations. * During the pendency of the litigation below, Shelly's family amended their
complaint to allege common law fraud. - Shelly's family argues that the statute of limitations for fraud, section 78-12-26(3), governs
these fraud claims, giving them three years
from the time they discovered the facts constituting the fraud in which to bring their
action. The trial court ruled that section 7814~4(l)(b), the two-year medical malpractice
statute of limitations, governed Shelly's family's claims for fraud. Alternatively, the court
held that if the ihree-year statute'applies,'
Shelly's family had established sufficient issues of material fact to withstand summary
judgment on their fraud claims. Shelly's
family seeks reversal of the first prong of
though the statute of limitations'had run on
Shell's underlying persona] injur}' claims b) the
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this holding, and Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee
seek reversal of the second. We uphold the
trial court's ruling that the medical malpractice statute of limitations governs Shelly's
family's fraud claims, and we need not reach
the second ruling.
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care rendered or which should have been
rendered by the health care provider."'
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14). Thus, the
medical malpractice act's two-year statute 9f
limitations applies to cases of fraudulent concealment arising out of medical malpractice.

[8] As stated above, when faced with two
i n contrast, the three-year fraud statute of
statutes that purport to cover the same sub- limitations, section 78-12-26, applies to any
ject, our primary duty "is to determine legis- action "for relief on the ground of fraud."
lative intent, and the best evidence of legis- T h e fraud s t a t u t e of limitations is thus far
lative intent is the plain language of the broader than the medical malpractice act,
statute." Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 879. A set- a n d o u r m]es o f s t a t u tory construction protied rule of statutory construction, which ^de t h a t t h e m o r e s p e c i f l c m e d i c a ] m a l p r a c .
helps us determine legislative intent, pro- t i c e a c t a p p l i e s i n s t e a d of t h e m o r e g e n e r a l
vides that "a more specific statute governs fraud s t a t u t e of limita tions.
instead of a more general statute." De Baritault, 913 P.2d at 748 (citation omitted).
Shelly s family argues that it has made a
The medical malpractice * statute of limita- general fraud claim and a constructive fraud
tions provides a two-year limit on -bringing c l a i m i n addition to, and distinct from, their
medical malpractice actions. The statute in- clai™s of fraudulent concealment discussed
eludes a 'discovery rule, providing that the a b o y e. . -However, we can find nothing in
two-year limitations period does not begin to t h e i r allegation of fraud or constructive fraud
run until the "patient discovers, or through t h at is in any way different from their claims
the use of reasonable diligence should have of fraudulent concealment. All the allegadiscovered the injury, whichever ..first, oc-, tions raised by Shelly's family surround their
curs." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1).*. .In claim that Dr.,Healy acted,to divert,the
Utah, the discovery rule includes the judi- family's attention away from his alleged malcially created doctrine of fraudulent conceal- practice when he had a duty to disclose the
ment. See Berenda, 914 P.2d at .51. .The facts of his relationship with attorneys Healy
fraudulent,concealment doctrine/is a mecha- and Sharp. The only damages arising out of
nism whereby a plaintiff "can avoid the full, Shelly's family's claims for fraud and con-j
operation of the discovery rule by making a" structive fraud relate to the possibility that
prima facie showing of fraudulent conceal- they were prevented from discovering thement and then demonstrating that given'the facts constituting their claim for medical maldefendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff practice. While we acknowledge that there'
would not have discovered the claim earlier." may be cases where a doctor commits fraud
Id. The medical malpractice statute of limi-' on a patient in a way that would not be
tations, with its discovery rule- and that covered by the medical malpractice act's
rule's fraudulent concealment doctrine, ap- fraudulent concealment provision, this is not
plies to every "malpractice action against a such a case. Given the specific facts alleged
health care provider." As noted above, the in this case, we cannot agree that Shelly's
statute defines "malpractice action against a family's fraud claim amounts to anything
health care provider" to include actions for more than or is different from a claim of
wrongful death "based upon alleged personal fraudulent concealment of medical malpracinjuries relating to or arising out of health tice.6 See Gillman v. Department of Fin.
6. Shelly's family claims that this reading of the
statutes would violate their nght to uniform operation of laws under article I, section 24 of the
Utah Constitution They argue that, read as outlined above, the medical malpractice statute creates two classes of people, those defrauded by
health care providers and those defrauded by
others and provides a shorter statute of hmita-

decline to address this issue as it is inadequately
researched and briefed. See Walker v. U.S. Gen.,
Inc, 916 P.2d 903, 90S (Utah 1996); Butler,
Crocket: & Walsh Dev Corp v Pineciest Pipeline
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 234 (Utah 1995);
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,, 966 (Utah
1989), Giaco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc v
h onwood Exvloi ahon, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1079
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Inst, 782 P.2d 506, 509, 511-12 (Utah 1989)
(rejecting attempts to recast claim for damages arising out of regulators' licensing decision as claim for negligence to avoid governmental immunity).
In conclusion, we hold that Shelly's family's wrongful death claims are governed by
the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions contained in section
78-14-4 of the Utah Code. We further conclude that the limitations period starts running when the patient or plaintiff discovers,
or through the exercise of due diligence
should have discovered, the underlying injury
and its origins in medical malpractice. We
remand this case for a factual finding as to
whether Shelly's family's claims of fraudulent
concealment will toll the statute of limitations
as to their wrongful death and survival
claims. We hold that the deceased's children
were not entitled to bring a wrongful death
claim because their mother had a guardian
appointed at the time of her death and thus
the children were not entitled to the provisions of the tolling statute. Finally, we hold
that Shelly's family's claims for common law
fraud are also governed by the two-year
medical malpractice 'statute of limitations
found in section 78-14-4 and decline to reach
their claims of the unconstitutionality of this
reading of the statute.
RUSSON, HOWE, EVES, and
HALLIDAY, JJ., concur in Chief Justice
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion.
Having disqualified themselves, Associate
Chief Justice STEWART and Justice
DURHAM do not participate herein; District
Judge J. PHILLIP EVES and District
Judge BRUCE K. HALLIDAY sat.
On Petition for Rehearing
This court now grants rehearing and issues
this opinion without hearing oral argument.
(Utah 1988); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,
1344 (Utah 1984)
As we recently noted in Monson v Carver, we
may refuse to address a claim of unconstitutionality where the party making the claim has failed
to make*the requisite showing to support the
claim 928 P 2d 10] 7, 1024 (Utah 1996) '"[A]
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues

We address whether we'should uphold summary judgment in favor of defendant
McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay-Dee") because plaintiffs Shayne Hipwell and Sherry
Jensen's wrongful death action against
McKay-Dee was barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-4. In our prior opinion
in this case, we reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment as to all defendants and remanded on the issue of whether
defendant Michael J. Healy's ("Dr. Healy")
alleged fraud in collaborating with plaintiffs'
original attorney was sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations on their medical malpractice claims once they had retained an
independent' attorney. Jensen v. IHC
Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 337 (1997). We
further held that Jensen and HipweU's attempt to recharacterize their medical malpractice wrongful death claim as a claim for
fraud was not sufficient to avoid the two-'1
year medical malpractice statute of limitations. Id. at 337. In its petition 'for rehearing, McKay-Dee now claims that'summary
judgment in its favor should have 'been upheld because (i) Dr. Healy's fraud does not
toll the statute of limitations as to Jensen
and HipweU's claims against McKay-Dee;
and (ii) Jensen and HipweU's allegations of
fraud on the part of McKay-Dee were properly dismissed by the trial court.
We begin with a brief review of the facts
relevant to our decision on rehearing. Because we are reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, we view the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving parties, Jensen
and Hipwell. Id. at 328. Jensen and Hipwell allege that Dr. Healy, who had staff
privileges at McKay-Dee but was not employed by McKay-Dee, committed malpractice on Shelly Hipwell (Jensen's daughter
and HipweU's wife) while she was a patient at
party may dump the burden of argument and
r e s e a r c h . ' " Id. (quoting Butler, 909 P.2d at
230-31) (additional citations omitted) In this
case, as in Monson, we are particularly loath to
address a claim of unconstitutionality of a statute
where the outcome would "critically depend on
factual research" into the effectiveness of these
^,ffOT.,r,r
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McKay-Dee. They claim that, to cover his
alleged malpractice, he and a McKay-Dee
doctor fraudulently transferred Shelly to
University Hospital. Jensen and Hipwell
further allege that Dr. Healy then colluded
with his brother, attorney Tim Healy, and
attorney Roger Sharp to prevent Jensen and
Hipwell from learning of the malpractice Dr.
Healy had allegedly committed. Jensen and
Hipwell made no allegation that McKay-Dee
knew about Dr. Healy's collusion with his
brother and attorney Sharp.
In our prior opinion, we held that Jensen
and Hipwell's allegations of fraud against Dr.
Healy were sufficient to toll the statute of
limitations on their claims as long as they
retained attorney Sharp. Id. at 336. However, we remanded to the trial court on the
issue of whether Dr. Healy's alleged fraud
was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations
after Jensen and Hipwell retained independent counsel but before that counsel had
actual knowledge of the facts constituting Dr.
Healy's alleged fraud. Id. at 336-337. The
issues we.now address are (i) whether Dr.
Healy's alleged fraud can also act to toll the
statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee; and
(ii) whether Jensen and Hipwell's allegations
of fraud on the part of McKay-Dee are sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as to
McKay-Dee. These issues were not discussed in our initial opinion.
[9,10] As to the first issue, whether Dr.
Healy's fraudulent collusion with Jensen and
Hipwell's original attorney can toll the statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee, the general rule is that fraud committed by a third
party m concealing a cause of action against
another defendant will not toll the statute of
limitations as to that defendant. See 51 A.
Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 150 (1970).
Where, however, there is an agency or privi1. The cases cited also include two other factors
to consider m determining whether an agent s
conduct will be imputed to the principal m the
employment context (^ whether the employee's
conduct is of the general kind the emplo)ee is
expected to perform, and (n) whether the employee's conduct occurred withm the hours of
the employee s work and ordinary spatial boundaries Hodocs 811 P 2d at 156 Bvknei, 111

ty relationship between the third party committing the fraud and the defendant, our
cases indicate that liability for the agent's
negligent or intentional tort can be imputed
to the principal if the agent acts m whole or
in part to carry out the purposes of the
principal. See Hodges v Gibson Prods Co.,
811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991); Birkner v.
Salt Lake County, 171 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah
1989).l On the record before us, we cannot
determine whether Dr. Healy's fraud in colluding with attorney Sharp and attorney
Healy should be imputed to McKay-Dee absent two factual findings: (i) that Dr. Healy
was McKay-Dee's agent; and (ii) that Dr.
Healy acted in whole or in part to further the
aims of McKay-Dee. The complaint makes
no allegations regarding these issues. We
remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
If the trial court finds that Dr. Healy was
McKay-Dee's agent and that he acted at'
least in part to further McKay-Dee's aims, it
should impute liability for Dr. Healy's fraud
to McKay-Dee and toll the statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee to the same extent it
is tolled as to Dr. Healy.2 If, on the other
hand, the trial court finds either that^ Dr.
Healy was not McKay-Dee's agent or that
Dr. Healy acted "entirely on personal motives unrelated to [McKay-Dee's] interests,"
Hodges, 811 P.2d at 157, then Dr. Healy's
fraud does not toll the statute of limitations
as to McKay-Dee and Jensen and Hipwell's
claims against McKay-Dee are barred.
Moving to the second issue raised on rehearing, Jensen and Hipwell argue that the
statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee
should be tolled because of fraud allegedly
committed by McKay-Dee, through one of its
doctors, in participating in an allegedly
fraudulent transfer of Shelly Hipwell from
McKay-Dee to University Hospital. Jensen
apply to the question of whether Dr Healy's acts
fall withm the scope of any agency relationship
he may have had with McKay-Dee.
2. We note, however, that this issue will be moot
if the fact finder determines, pursuant to our
prior opinion, that Jensen and Hipwell's complaint was not timely filed because Dr Healy's
£_« ,A A,A -nr\t mil thp statute of limitations long
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and Hipwell did not originally argue that
McKay-Dee had committed fraud that would
toll the statute of limitations. Their complaint did, however, include a count of constructive fraud against McKay-Dee. The
trial court held first that the medical malpractice statute of limitations, section 78-144 of the Code, barred Jensen and Hipwell's
claim of constructive fraud against McKayDee. In the alternative, the trial court ruled
that the claim was "unsupported by the
facts" and that there was "insufficient evidence to submit this matter to a jury as the
fact finder." In our original opinion, we
Upheld the trial court's finding that Jensen
and Hipwell's claim for constructive fraud
amounted to nothing more than a claim for
medical malpractice, which would be barred
by the medical malpractice statute of limitations. Jensen, at 337. We did not address,
however, the contention that Jensen and HipWell's allegations of constructive fraud on the
part of McKay-Dee would be sufficient to toll
the statute of limitations on Jensen and HipWell's medical malpractice claims against
McKay-Dee. We find that the trial court
properly granted summary judgment to
McKay-Dee, ruling that Jensen and Hipwell's constructive fraud claim was insufficiency supported by the evidence and therefore could^not be used to toll the statute of
limitations.

support his or her claim, particularly when
that party has had an opportunity to conduct discovery. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party opposing a
properly supported motion for summary
judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his [or her] pleading,
but his [or her] response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial? Utah R. Civ. P. •
56(e) (emphasis added). Put another way,
once the moving party has brought forth
evidence either tending to prove a lack of
genuine issue of material fact or challenging
the existence of one of the elements of the
cause of action, the nonmovmg party then,
bears the burden of "providing] some evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, in support of
the essential elements of his [or her] claim."
Thayne, 814 P.2d at 124.
[ll, 12] In this case, Jensen and Hipwell
failed to provide any such evidence to support their claim of constructive' fraud. ' Constructive fraud requires two elements:" (i) a
confidential relationship between the parties;
and (ii) a failure to disclose material facts.
See Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 301-02
(Utah 1978); 37 Am'. Jur.' 2d Fraud and!
Deceit §§ 4, 15 (1968). Jensen and Hipwell's
complaint alleges both (i) that McKay-Dee's'
employee, Dr. Baughman, had a confidential
relationship with Shelly'and her family as
one of her treating physicians, and (ii) that
Dr. Baughman failed to disclose that he had
committed medical malpractice in treating
Shelly. McKay-Dee's motion for summary
judgment did not challenge Jensen and Hipwell's assertion that Dr. Baughman had a
confidential relationship with Shelly and her
family. McKay-Dee's motion, however, did
dispute Jensen and Hipwell's allegation that
Dr. Baughman failed to disclose his alleged
malpractice. McKay-Dee produced the deposition of Dr. Baughman, wherein he states,
"I have no question at all that [Shelly] received care that's exemplary, that could be
used as an example of the management of a
good operation." Dr. Baughman further indicated that he held that belief at the time he

Addressing the merits of this claim requires a careful analysis of the relative burdens of proof and production involved in
making and opposing a motion for summary
judgment. As noted above, when reviewing
a motion for summary judgment, we view all
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 328. On a motion for
summary judgment, the moving party bears
the burden of proof for its motion, namely,
the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. However, in opposing a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff still
has the ultimate burden of proving all the
elements of his or her cause of action.
Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d
120, 124 (Utah 1994). Further, once chal- provided Shelly's care. McKay-Dee properly, --L^-n__^ T « . „„A U I ^ A I I ' . nlloo-of^v,
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his duty to disclose material facts to them,
namely, the fact that he had committed malpractice, by producing Dr. Baughman's deposition in which he states that he did not
believe and does not believe that he committed malpractice.
Jensen and Hipwell, however, as the non- '
moving parties, utterly failed to meet their
burden of coming forward with evidence to
contradict Dr. Baughman's deposition testimony. In their opposition to McKay-Dee's
motion for summary judgment, Jensen and
Hipwell simply reiterate the allegations of
their complaint and provide no support for
their claim that Dr. Baughman failed to tell
them that Shelly had been "left to bleed
internally for several hours before accurately
diagnosing her illness." Dr. Baughman's deposition testimony specifically and directly
challenges Jensen and Hipwell's assertion,
and they failed to provide any evidence to
support their claim. Thus, the' trial court
correctly ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to submit the matter to a jury.
Because Jensen and Hipwell's claim of constructive fraud against McKay-Dee was insufficiently supported by the evidence, such a
claim cannot be used to toll the statute of
limitations on -their medical malpractice
claims against McKay-Dee.
-We remand to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
(o

| KIY NUMB£1RSYST£M>

Lan C. ENGLAND, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Eugene HORBACH, an individual, Medicode, Inc., a Utah corporation, and Does
I through V, Defendants and Petitioners.
No. 950506.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May SO, 1997.
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under which buyer was to pay seller $25,000
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grounds that accord and satisfaction lacked
consideration, and 'seller appealed. The
Court of Appeals, 905 P.2d 301, reversed and
remanded. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1)
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owed on contract, and then determining that
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accord and satisfaction to apply, and (2) failure to object at trial precluded challenge to
trial court's allowance of counterclaim by
buyer, alleging overpayment of $169,501.75.
Court of Appeals' judgment reversed;
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL, individually and on
behalf of all other heirs of
Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley
Michele Hipwell and Kaycie
Shaylene Hipwell appearing by
Shayne Hipwell as Guardian
ad Litem,

AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

920904182

Plaintiffs,
vs.
IHC HOSPITALS, INC,, dba
McKAY-DEE HOSPITAL; MICHAEL
J. HEALY, M.D., AND DOES
I through X,
Defendants.

This case was before the Court on January 9, 1995 for oral
argument

on

defendants'

Second

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment.

Plaintiffs were represented by Richard Burbidge, Gary Johnson and
Simon

Forgette.

Defendant

Healy

was

represented

by

Elliott

Williams, defendant IHC Hospitals was represented by James Gilson
and Kathy Lavitt.
under

advisement.

exhibits

submitted

After oral argument, the Court took the matter
The
in

Court

has

reviewed

the

support

and

opposition

Memoranda

and

to the parties'

respective positions, and has reviewed a transcript of the oral
arguments made to the Court on January 9, 1995.

The reason for a

JENSEN V. IHC

PAGE TWO

AMENDED DECISION

seemingly

long delay from oral argument to decision was based

partially

on the Court's availability

of time, the voluminous

documents submitted by the parties, but mainly on the difficulties
in fully examining and assessing the legal, factual and equitable
issues involved in this case.
To begin with, the main contention of the defendants is that
all of plaintiffs' claims are barred by the two year statute of
limitations contained in Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-4.

The

plaintiffs respond by asserting that the applicable statute of
limitations

is

Utah

Code

Ann.,

Section

78-12-28(2)

regarding

wrongful death actions, and also that any statute of limitations
was tolled, based upon the minority of the deceased's children, and
finally, material issues of fact preclude Summary Judgment on all
issues dealing with the statute of limitations.
Utah's medical malpractice statute of limitations, Utah Code
Ann., Section 78-14-4, provides, among other things:
No malpractice action against a health care provider may
be brought unless it is commenced within two years after
the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury,
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years
after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or
occurrence. . . .
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To aid in the interpretation of this section, the Court has
read in detail the following cases:
1.

Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979)

2.

Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah App. 1989)

3.

Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181

(Utah 1989).
While these cases are factually different and do not address
identical legal issues, they generally hold that the statute of
limitations does not commence until the plaintiff is in possession
of facts that would indicate that a reasonable person knew or
should have known that they have sustained an injury, and knew or
should

have

negligence.

known

that

the

injury

may

have

been

caused

by

Chapman further discusses discovery of legal injury

encompassing both awareness of physical injury and knowledge that
the injury is or may be attributable to negligence.
I am aware of plaintiffs' position in that the wrongful death
action by the mother and husband of the deceased was timely filed
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-28(2), and further that
Utah

Code Ann., Section

bringing

78-12-36

tolls the time

a cause of action until the minor

for a minor

reaches majority;

however, this analysis will deal mainly with the interpretation and
dispositive nature of Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-4.
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The initial investigation of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital
by attorney Roger Sharp in early 1989 is the earliest date that
defendants rely upon to commence the running of the statute of
limitations.

While plaintiffs characterize his investigation as a

sham, it is apparent that Sharp, at least, was aware of possible
claims

against both Dr. Healy

and McKay-Dee Hospital.

While

criticism by plaintiffs as to the scope and legitimacy of Sharp's
inquiry,

it

is not disputed
Healy

and

that

by April,

McKay-Dee

1989, he

Hospital

as

clearly

considered

Dr.

potential

defendants.

The retention of Dr. Johnson in April, 1989, to review

medical records, albeit in abbreviated form, was done in connection
with possible claims against both defendants.

While the Court is

extremely critical of the actions taken by Roger Sharp, attorney
Tim Healy and Diane DeVries, in the manner that this case was
solicited, the eventual retention of Roger Sharp and his initial
inquiry

into

the case

started

the

running

of the

statute

of

limitations.
Even after the questionable settlement was reached by order of
the Court on May 22, 198 9, the plaintiffs had further opportunity
to undertake additional investigation into the possibly ongoing
claims against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital.
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On or about August 10, 198 9, the law office of Simon Forgette
had been contacted by Carol Pederson regarding the inadequacy of
the settlement in Hipwell's case. On August 29, 1989, Mr. Forgette
spoke with Pederson and by September 18, 1989 he was outlining
possible problems with the settlement and conduct of attorney
Sharp.

On October 19, 1989, he was orally retained by Sherry

Jensen to investigate this case.
was

well

underway

regarding

By mid-1990, his investigation

the

possible

legal

malpractice

involved, and the underlying claims that were a basis for the legal
malpractice, i.e., the possible medical malpractice.
It is the Court's opinion that Mr. Forgette had to consider
the possibility of negligence on the part of Dr. Healy and McKayDee Hospital in assessing the basis for the legal malpractice
action.

Even though

Forgette was not finally retained

until

January, 1990, his oral retention of October 19, 1989 clearly
demonstrated that Forgette was in possession of facts whereby he
knew or should have known that Sherry Hipwell's condition was
caused or possibly caused by negligence on the part of McKay-Dee
Hospital and Dr. Healy.

Therefore, the December 16, 1991 filing of

a Notice of Intent to commence a medical malpractice action against
Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital is barred by Utah Code Ann.,
Section 78-14-4.
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Plaintiffs' survival action is also barred by the statute of
limitations in that the claim is a continuation of the decedent's
cause of action for personal injury, and survivors are in no better
position than the decedent had the decedent survived.
Plaintiffs' wrongful death action is more problematic to the
Court.

I recognize that this is separate and distinct from the

survival claims, and both sides have ably supported their positions
with case law and argument.
because

Nonetheless, the Court finds that

the medical malpractice

statute

of

limitations

barred

Sherry Hipwell's action at the time of her death and thus bars the
survival action, plaintiffs have no wrongful death claim.

This is

based upon the proposition that plaintiffs have a right to proceed
against defendants, but their rights are subject to any defenses
available

against

the

deceased

had

the

deceased

lived

and

prosecuted the suit in their own behalf.
Turning to the plaintiffs' fraud claims against Dr. Healy, the
controlling statute of limitations is not Utah Code Ann., Section
78-12-26(3), but rather Section 78-14-4.

With that, the fraud

claims are also barred; however, if they were not barred, the
existence of material facts in dispute would make this issue one
for the jury.

A a1 4 ^ A t
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The claim for constructive fraud against McKay-Dee Hospital is
also barred by Section 78-14-4(1)(b) and even if it were not, this
claim is unsupported by the facts.

There is insufficient evidence

to submit this matter to a jury as the fact finder.
Finally, plaintiffs' May 17, 1989 Release of All Claims does
not bar plaintiffs' claims

in this

action.

While the plain

language of the Release is clear and unambiguous, its effect must
be read in conjunction with the May 22, 1989 probate order and the
amended

order

authorizing

the

settlement

with

the

University

Hospital and Dr. Weis, not as against all potential defendants.
I have been extremely impressed with the work done by all
counsel, both in written briefs, as well as oral argument.

This

decision was not one in which I considered lightly, but it was one
which was reached with considerable effort, taking into account the
facts, legal theories and equities involved.

I am sure this case

will

I

be

subject

to

appellate

review,

and

look

forward

direction from the appellate courts in future proceedings.

to
Mr.

Williams please prepare the necessary documents pursuant to this

GLENN K. IWASAKI
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Thnd JociscsaS District

MAR 1 5 1995
/

ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483)
KURT M. FRANKENBURG (A5279)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D,
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone (801) 521-5678

By-

SAuT-AKE COdN fV

K£lih .

Deputy Clsrk

RICHARD W. CASEY (A0590)
KATHY A. LAVITT (A5987)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER & PETERSON
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383
JAMES W. GILSON (A1197)
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc.
3 6 South State Street, Suite 2200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-8282

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL, individually and on
behalf of all other heirs of
Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley
Michele Hipwell and Kaycie
Shaylene Hipwell appearing by
Shayne Hipwell as Guardian Ad
Litem,
Plaintiffs,

IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba
McKAY-DEE HOSPITAL;
MICHAEL J. HEALY, M.D. and
DOES I THROUGH X,
Defendants.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 920904182 CV
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants IHC Hospitals,
Inc, dba McKay-Dee Hospital and Michael J. Healy, M.D. came on
regularly for hearing and disposition before the above-entitled
Court on January 9, 1995, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
presiding.

Plaintiffs were represented by Richard D. Burbidge,

Esq., Gary R. Johnson, Esq. and Simon H. Forgette, Esq.
Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D. was represented by Elliott J.
Williams, Esq. and Kurt M. Frankenburg, Esq.

Defendant IHC

Hospitals, Inc. was represented by James W. Gilson, Esq. and
Kathy A. Lavitt, Esq.

The Court, having reviewed and analyzed

the extensive memoranda, affidavits and supporting materials
filed by the parties, having entertained and considered oral
arguments of counsel, having taken the matter under advisement
and having issued its written Amended Memorandum Decision on
February 21, 1995, in accordance with Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, now therefore, for the reasons and upon the
grounds set forth in the Amended Memorandum Decision, it is
hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants' Second
Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby granted and
judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendants and against
Plaintiffs, no cause.jaf,action, with costs awarded to Defendants.
Dated this •TJJ''T^dav of March, 1995.
BY

THJ^C&iTkT:

GLENN K. IWA'SAKI (/
District Court Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RLE&ZRsTBiST COURT
Third Jurif nial District

SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL, individually
and on behalf of all other
heirs of Shelly Hipwell,
and Ashley Michele Hipwell
and Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell
appearing by Shayne Hipwell
as Guardian Ad Litem,

rifti

2 8 1998
Deputy Cbrk

MINUTE ENTRY
Case NO.920904182CV

Plaintiffs,
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI
vs.
Court Clerk: Janet Banks
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba
McKay-Dee Hospital, MICHAEL
J. HEALY, M.D., and DOES I
through X,

January 28, 1998

Defendants.

In Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc. 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 24,
(April 4,1997), the Supreme Court of Utah stated:
Fraudulent concealment requires that one
with a legal duty or obligation to
communicate certain facts remain silent or
otherwise act to conceal material facts known
to him. 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud & Deceit § 145
(1968). Such a duty or obligation may arise
from a relationship of trust between the
parties, and inequality of knowledge or power
between the parties, or other attendant
circumstances indicating reliance. Id. The
party's silence must amount to fraud. . . Id.
Such "concealment or nondisclosure becomes
fraudulent only when there is an existing
fact or condition. . . which the party
charged is under a duty to disclose." Id.
1

Making use of a device that misleads, some
trick or contrivance that is intended to
exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry, may
also amount to fraudulent concealment. Id.
It is this aspect of fraudulent concealment
that is at issue in the instant, (emphasis
added).
Shelly's family's argument must run as
follows: (I) Dr. Healy was in a position of
superior knowledge and was the beneficiary of
Shelly's and her family's trust; (ii) this
superior knowledge and position of trust
created a duty to disclose material facts
regarding Shelly's care; (iii) Dr. Healy knew
of his brother's involvement with attorney
Sharp and knew of the cursory nature ofattorney Sharp's investigation but did not
disclose these facts to Shelly's family or,
alternatively, concealed them from Shelly's
family to divert attention from his alleged
malpractice; (iv) Dr. Healy knew that
Shelly's family would rely on attorney
Sharp's investigation to uncover any
malpractice on his part, thus creating a duty
on his part to disclose the facts of his
association with attorneys Healy and Sharp;
(v) in this manner, Dr. Healy used his
position of influence with his brother and
attorney Sharp to divert Shelly's family's
attention away from his care of Shelly
thereby preventing them from discovering the
facts constitution the alleged malpractice.
Therefore, despite the statement, "The question becomes:
Would a reasonable attorney, presented with the facts that
attorney Forgette knew in December of 1989, have considered
investigating a medical malpractice case against Dr. Healy and
McKay-Dee" the Supreme Court of Utah clearly contemplated a much
more detailed examination of the facts than merely inquiring
regarding what Forgette knew.

Indeed, immediately preceding the
2

aforementioned was the statement:
xx

In other words, the jury must determine
whether the facts in this case indicate that
Dr. Healy's fraudulent concealment somehow
prevented Shelly's family, who, by retaining
attorney Forgette, had defeated the collusion
of Dr. Healy with his brother and attorney
Sharp, from inquiring into the possibility of
medical malpractice on the part of Dr. Healy
and McKay-Dee." (emphasis added).
Although not completely clear, this statement seems to indicate
some investigation regarding the effect of the concealment on
Shelly's family is mandated.
This having been said, however, the Court is not persuaded
that a full trial of all the issues involved is mandated in this
case.

Rather, the Court is convinced that a separate trial on

the statute of limitations issue, which includes inquiry into the
effect of any concealment on Shelly's family's knowledge
regarding a possible cause of action, would be the most effective
method of resolving this matter.

As noted by the Utah Supreme

Court, the outcome of this issue "will determine whether Shelly's
family is entitled to proceed on both their survival claims and
their wrongful death claims."

Jensen supra.

In addition to promoting fairness and efficiency, such a
resolution is supported by Utah law.

Specifically, in Peschamps

v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals of
Utah, noting the case of Foil v. Ballinaer, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah
1979)—which addressed the legal injury test, stated:
[A] legal determination of negligence is not
3

necessary to start the statute of
limitations. Rather, the crucial question is
whether the plaintiff was aware of the facts
that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that he may have a cause of action
against the health care provider.
Based upon the forgoing, Defendants' Joint Motion for
Separate Trial on the Statute of limitations Issue is granted, in
part.

Inquiry regarding the effect of any fraudulent concealment

on Shelly's family's knowledge regarding a possible cause of
action will be allowed.

Accordingly, the issues of medical

negligence, causation and damages are reserved for a subsequent

DATED this {*JLy

day of January, 1998.
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mi998
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL, individually and on
behalf of all other heirs of
SHELLY HIPWELL, and ASHLEY
MICHELE HIPWELL and KAYCIE
SHAYLENE HIPWELL appearing by
SHAYNE HIPWELL as guardian ad
litem,

Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No.

920904182 CV

Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI

Plaintiffs,

Court Clerk: Janet Banks
October 29, 1998

vs,
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAYDEE HOSPITAL, and MICHAEL J.
HEALY, M.D. and DOES I THROUGH
X,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
defendant, IHC Hospitals', Inc.'s

Motion to Strike the Affidavit

of Gregory DeVore, and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or,
Alternatively for Summary Judgment.

The Court heard oral argument

on the motions on September 28, 1998.

Following the hearing, the

matters were taken under advisement.
As an initial concern, the Court notes that pursuant to Rule
12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered
(6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading no
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state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
In the instant matter, defendant has submitted the affidavit
of Thomas Hanrahan in support of its position that Dr. Healy,
and/or Dr. Baughman, were acting outside the scope of their
employment.
Pleadings

Accordingly, defendant's Motion for Judgment on the
or

Alternatively

for

Summary

Judgment

is

most

appropriately treated as a motion for summary judgment.
1.

Motion to Strike
With this motion, defendant seeks to strike the affidavit of

Dr. Gregory DeVore arguing (1) it raises allegations which have not
been pled; (2) Dr. DeVore, a perinatologist, is incompetent to
testify about the standard of care of Dr. Baughman, an intensivist;
and (3) Dr. DeVore lacks personal knowledge of the relationship
between Healy and McKay-Dee.
Plaintiffs

oppose

the motion

contending

Dr. DeVore has

unquestionable professional credentials and is very familiar with
toxemia and HELLP Syndrome, which occurred in this case. Moreover,
contend plaintiffs, although Dr. DeVore is a perinatologist, the
standard of care for the treatment of HELLP Syndrome is identical
for perinatologists, obstetricians and mtensivists.

Furthermore,
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it is plaintiffs' position Dr. DeVore has personal knowledge and is
intimately familiar with the day to day operations of the defendant
hospital and is familiar with the relationship between doctors
having staff privileges ar the hospital and the McKay-Dee staff and
administration.
Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant
is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein.
In the case at bar, Dr. DeVore's Affidavit establishes he has
sufficient professional credentials, has reviewed all of Shelly
Hipwell's medical records and is intimately familiar with toxemia
and

HELLP

Syndrome.

Further,

although

Dr.

DeVore

is

a

perinatologist, his uncontroverted affidavit demonstrates that the
standard of care for the treatment of HELLP Syndrome is identical
for perinatologists, obstetricians and intensivists.

Finally, for

the reasons stated in the following ruling on the motion for
summary judgment, the Court finds defendant's assertion that the
affidavit raises allegations which have not been pled is without
merit.

Based

upon

the

forgoing,

the motion

to

strike

is

respectfully denied.
2.

Motion for Summary Judgment
With this motion, defendant contends Dr. Healy's alleged fraud
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does not toll the statute of limitations because (1) as recognized
by the Supreme Court, plaintiffs' complaint makes no allegations
either that Dr. Healy was the agent of McKay-Dee or that he acted
to further the aims of McKay Dee; (2) Dr. Healy was, in fact, not
an agent of McKay Dee because, as noted in the case of Tolman v.
IHC Hospitals, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 382 (D. Utah C D . 1986), an
independently acting "physician could not act as agent of the
hospital"; and

(3) even if Dr. Healy had been McKay-Dee's agent,

his fraudulent concealment was not within the scope of his agency.
Indeed, asserts defendant, as noted in the affidavit of Thomas
Hanrahan, Dr. Healy's fraudulent actions would have been contrary
to McKay-Dee's interest to review, evaluate, and correct patient
care problems through its quality improvement program.
Plaintiffs oppose the motion asserting they have alleged facts
which would support a finding that a privity and/or an agency
relationship existed between Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee and that the
actions to cover up his negligence were, at least in part, in
furtherance of McKay-Dee's interests. Moreover, although Dr. Healy
was not technically an employee of McKay-Dee he nevertheless had a
privity and/or agency relationship with the facility as he worked
in a partnership and close concerted effort with hospital staff
physicians such as Dr. Baughman and the ICU medical director.
Further, assert plaintiffs, Dr. Healy's involvement of his brother
was in furtherance of the common design that he and Dr. Eaughman
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had in transferring Shelly Hipwell out of the IHC system, namely,
covering up their joint negligence arising out of the co-management
of Shelly Hipwell's care in the ICU at McKay-Dee.
"In reviewing a summary judgment, this court
must liberally construe the evidence and all
inferences that may be reasonably drawn from
the evidence in favor of the party opposing
the motion." Evans v. GTE Health Svs. Inc.,
857 P.2d 974, 976 (Utah App.), cert, granted,
868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). "The trial court must
not weigh evidence or assess credibility" in a
summary judgment. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Atkin, Wright & MIIPS. 681 P.2d 1258,
1261 (Utah 1984). In short, a court should not
make findings of fact in a summary judgment
other than a restatement of the undisputed
facts stated in favor of the nonmoving party.
See Estate Landscape v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co., 793 P.2d 415, 418 n.8 (Utah App.
1990), revfd on other grounds, 844 P.2d 322
(Utah 1992).
Doubois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073 (Ct. App. 1994).
In its August 22, 1997 decision, the Supreme Court stated the
following:
Jensen and Hipwell allege that Dr. Healy,
who had staff privileges at McKay-Dee but was
not
employed
by
McKay-Dee,
committed
malpractice on Shelly Hipwell
(Jensen's
daughter and Hipwell!s wife) while she was a
patient at McKay-Dee. They claim that, to
cover his alleged malpractice, he and a
McKay-Dee doctor fraudulently transferred
Shelly to University Hospital. Jensen and
Hipwell further allege that Dr. Healy then
colluded with his brother, attorney Tim Healy,
and attorney Roger Sharp to prevent Jensen and
Hipwell from learning of the malpractice Dr.
Healy had allegedly committed. Jensen and
Hipwell made no allegation that McKay-Dee knew
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about Dr. Healy's collusion with his brother
and attorney Sharp.

As to the first issue, whether Dr.
Healy's fraudulent collusion with Jensen and
HipwellTs original attorney can toll the
statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee, the
general rule is that fraud committed by a
third party in concealing a cause of action
against another defendant will not toll the
statute of limitations as to that defendant.
See 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 150
(1970) . Where, however, there is an agency or
privity relationship between the third party
committing the fraud and the defendant, our
cases indicate that liability for the agent!s
negligent or intentional tort can be imputed
to the principal if the agent acts in whole or
in part to carry out the purposes of the
principal. See Hodaes v. Gibson Prods. Co.,
811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991); Birkner v. Salt
Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989).
On the record before us, we cannot determine
whether Dr. Healy's fraud in colluding with
attorney Sharp and attorney Healy should be
imputed to McKay-Dee absent two factual
findings: (i) that Dr. Healy was McKay-Dee's
agent; and (ii) that Dr. Healy acted in whole
or in part to further the aims of McKay-Dee.
The complaint makes no allegations regarding
these issues. We remand to the trial court for
further proceedings.
Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 337, 338.
In light of the aforementioned directives it is clear the
Supreme Court, based upon the same arguments made in support of
this motion, determined this was not an issue of pleadings.
Indeed, this was made abundantly clear when the Supreme Court, in
spite of its statement that

xx

[t]he complaint makes no allegations
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regarding these issues," remanded the matter for two specific
factual findings

Id.

Accordingly, despite any opinion of this

Court to the contrary, the pleadings with respect to these issues
have already been determined to be sufficient.
Turning next to the question of whether Dr. Healy was McKayDee's agent, it is critical to note the Supreme Court specifically
used the term "privity" thus signaling the possibility of liability
based upon something less than an actual agency relationship.

With

this in mind, and after reviewing plaintiffs' complaint as well as
the affidavit of Dr. DeVore, it appears plaintiffs have alleged
facts which support a finding that such a privity or agency-like
relationship

existed

between

Dr.

Healy

and

McKay-Dee.

Specifically, according to the affidavit of Dr. DeVore, Dr. Healy
worked

in a partnership and close concerted

hospital staff, including staff physicians.

effort with the

From these statements,

as well as others made by Dr. DeVore, a jury could reasonably
conclude the requisite relationship, as defined by the Supreme
Court, existed and accordingly, Dr. Healy's conduct could be
imputed to McKay-Dee.
Finally, if an agency or privity relationship is found to have
been

created between Dr. Healy

and McKay-Dee,

the Court is

persuaded a jury could reasonably find that the actions taken by
Dr. Healy, allegedly to cover up his negligence, were, at least in
part, done in furtherance of McKay-Dee's interests.
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Based upon the forgoing, defendant's Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, treated as
a motion for summary -judgment, is respectfully denied,
DATED this C '

day of October, 1998.

\, At,

^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HLEB BSSTRIGT COURT
Third Judicial District

SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL, individually and on
behalf of all other heirs of
Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley
Michele Hipwell and Kaycie
Shaylene Hipwell appearing by
Shayne Hipwell as Guardian Ad
Litem,
Plaintiffs,

M 2 7 1999
p.

^CTwl*3
Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No.

920904182CV

Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI
Court Clerk: Janet Banks

vs

July 27, 1999
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., d.b.a.
McKAY-DEE Hospital; MICHAEL J.
HEALY, M.D., and Does I through
Defendants.
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendants' Joint Motion for Approval of Special Verdict Form and
Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Special Verdict Form.

Oral

argument was held with respect to these motions on July 26, 1999.
Following the hearing, the matters were taken under advisement.
The Court having now considered the motions and memoranda as
well as the applicable statutory and case law hereby enters the
following ruling.
With their motion, defendants seek to have the following
special verdict form presented to the jury in the statute of
limitations trial: "Would a reasonable attorney, presented with the

facts that attorney Forgette knew prior to December 16, 1989, have
considered investigating a medical malpractice case against Dr.
Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital?"
Plaintiffs oppose the motion and seek to have the following on
the special verdict form: ''Prior to December 16, 1989, did attorney
Forgette discover or under the circumstances is it reasonable that
he should have discovered the legal injury done to Shelly Hipwell
by Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital?"
Pursuant to § 78-14-4, the statute of limitations begins to
run at the time "the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury,
whichever first occurs."

In their opinion, the Supreme Court

reaffirms this standard stating "[t]he issue before the trier of
fact

in this case is whether

attorney

Forgette

discovered or

reasonably should have discovered the legal injury done to Shelly
Hipwell before December 16, 1989."
944 P.2d 327, 335 (Utah 1997).

Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.,

Indeed, an unbroken line of cases

makes clear this is the state of the law in Utah.1

Furthermore,

"[d]iscovery of legal injury, therefore, encompasses both awareness
of physical injury and knowledge that the injury is or may
attributable

1

to negligence."

be

Collins v. Wilson, 370 Utah Adv. Rep.

See, Collins v. Wilson, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 9 (Utah
1999) ("We have long held that the two-year statute of
limitations period commences to run only when the injured person
knew or should have known or an injury and that the injury was
caused by a negligent act.") See also Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d
1361, 1363 (Utah 1996); Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144, 147-148
(Urah 1979).

6, 9 (Utah 1999) (quoting Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784
P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added in Collins) .
Despite language in Jensen indicating the legal standard is
when Forgette first considered

or should have considered a medical

malpractice case against the defendants, the aforementioned makes
clear the appropriate legal standard is as set forth by plaintiffs
in their proposed special verdict. Accordingly, Defendants' Joint
Motion

for

Approval

of

Special

Verdict

Form

is

denied

and

Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Special Verdict Form is granted.
DATED this 2

/ day of July, 1999.

By.

Deputy Cleric

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL, individually and on
behalf of all other heirs of
SHELLY HIPWELL, and ASHLEY
MICHELLE HIPWELL and KAYCIE
SHAYLENE HIPWELL appearing by
SHAYNE HIPWELL, as guardian
ad litem,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO.

920904182

Plaintiffs,
vs.
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAYDEE HOSPITAL, and MICHAEL J.
HEALY, M.D., and DOES I
through X,
Defendants.

The above-entitled

matter was

before the

Court

argument on October 13, 1999, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.

for oral
Richard D.

Burbidge .and Simon H. Forgette on behalf of plaintiffs, Elliott J.
Williams, Kurt M. Frankenberg, Richard W. Casey, Andrew Diess, and
James W. Gilson for defendants.

The Court heard oral argument on

various Motions filed by the parties, and took the matter under
advisement.

After consideration of Memoranda, oral argument, and

previous rulings of the Court, the Court rules as follows:
1.

The

Court

denies

defendants1

Motion

to

Modify

the

approved Special Verdict Form. As previously ruled upon, the issue
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before the jury will be "prior to December 16, 1989, did attorney
Forgette discover, or under the circumstances is it reasonable that
he should have discovered, the legal injury done to Shelly Hipwell
by Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital."
2.

Plaintiffs'

"discover" or

proposed

"discovered"

jury

is denied.

instruction
The

regarding

Court will give

defendants1 proposed instruction as contained in MUJI 6.37.
3.

The

balance

of

the

defendants1

requested

jury

instructions on imputed knowledge of attorney and discovery by
Roger Sharp will not be received.
4.

Any evidence of fraudulent concealment or coverup will be

allowed only to the extent that it is necessary to rebut facts or
inferences of what attorney Forgette should have known prior to
December 16, 1989.

It is not the Court's intention to allow

plaintiff to put on every single aspect of the allegations of
fraudulent coverup in their case in chief, but rather to restrict
it to those parts pertinent as to issues raised by the defense
regarding the scope of knowledge that Forgette knew or should have
known.
5.

With the ruling of the Court reemphasizing the scope of

the first trial, the Motion in Limine regarding agency and privity
is not relevant and said Motion will be granted.

JENSEN V. IHC
6.
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Evidence

of

the

alleged

MINUTE ENTRY
lacerated

liver

and

other

references to damage to the liver will be allowed; any material
contained in Forgette's file after 12/16/89 will be subject to
relevance

and

objections

thereto;

Forgettefs

contemplated

contingency fee agreement in total will be allowed; there will be
no mention of previous Summary Judgments or prior appeals in this
matter; and the Court grants the plaintiffs' Motion in Limine as to
the subsequent determination by this Court that the release of
McKay-Dee was not valid.
7.

Plaintiffs1

Motions

in

Limine/Exclusion

as

to

the

testimony of attorneys Thronson and Jacobson are presently denied;
the Court had indicated in oral argument that I would have to rule
on

evidentiary

objections

as

they

examination/cross-examination.
Dated this

day of O^fcqijer, 19 99

were

raised

during

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL, individually and on behalf
of all other heirs of Shelly Hipwell; and
ASHLEY MICHELLE HIPWELL and
KAYCIE SHAYLENE HIPWELL,
appearing by SHAYNE HIPWELL, as
Guardian Ad Litem,

SPECIAL VERDICT nim msTBICT COURT
Third Judicial District

CT 2 6 1999
SAL/ LAK£ CO'

&

Plaintiffs,

Deputy Cleric

vs.
Civil No. 920904182CV
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAYDEE HOSPITAL; MICHAEL J. HEALY,
M.D.; and DOES I through X,

(Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki)

Defendants.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following question:
1. Prior to December 16, 1989, did attorney Forgette discover, or under the
circumstances is it reasonable that he should have discovered, the legal injury done to
Shelly Hipwell by Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital?
ANSWER:

YES

NO _

DATED this a 4-May of October, 1999.

FOREPERSON

~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
_ _ „

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial uisirict

SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL, individually and on
behalf of all other heirs of
Shelly Hipwell; and ASHLEY
MICHELLE HIPWELL and KAYCIE
SHAYLENE HIPWELL, appearing by
SHAYNE HIPWELL, as Guardian Ad
Litem,

EB 1 7 2000
JLTLAKEPOU

Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 920904182CV
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI

Plaintiff,
Court Clerk: Janet Banks
vs .
February 16, 2000
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAYDEE HOSPITAL; MICHAEL J. HEALY,
M.D.; and DOES I through X,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, in
the Alternative, for a New Trial.

The Court heard oral argument

with respect to this motion on February 2, 2000.

Following the

hearing, the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the
following ruling.
1.

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

A judgment notwithstanding the verdict can be granted only

JENSEN v. IHC HOSPITALS
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when the losing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988).

Courts will only

revise a verdict if, in viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party who prevailed, they conclude that the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.

Id.

Defendants move this Court for a judgment as a matter of law
arguing

the

undisputed

evidence

at

trial

establishes

that

(objectively) an attorney possessing the information Forgette had
prior

to

December

16,

1989,

would

have

inquired

into

the

possibility of defendants' malpractice.
In the instant case, viewing all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, specifically, the testimony of
Forgette and the records from IHC d.b.a. McKay-Dee Hospital which
reflected no indication of medical negligence at McKay-Dee, the
Court is persuaded a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is not
appropriate in this matter
2.

New Trial

When a party challenges the sufficiency of evidence underlying
a jury's decision, the trial court should grant a new trial "only
if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah
1991) .
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With this motion, defendants argue a new trial is appropriate
for three reasons: (1) the jury's decision necessarily ignored the
undisputed testimony regarding a reasonable attorney and therefore,
is manifestly against the weight of the evidence; (2) the special
verdict

misstated

the question

remanded to be answered,

the

Supreme

Court

specifically

failed to make clear that Forgette's

conduct was to be measured against that of a reasonable attorney,
and inevitably confused the jury; and

(3) plaintiffs' expert L.

Rich Humpherys wrongly testified that under Utah law, discovery
does not begin when an attorney inquiries into the possibility of
medical malpractice.
With respect to the first basis for a new trial, as noted
above, the jury's decision was not manifestly against the weight of
the evidence.
As to the special verdict, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure:
No party may assign as error the giving or the
failure to give an instruction unless he
objects thereto. In objecting to the giving
of an instruction, a party must
state
distinctly the matter to which he objects and
the grounds for his objection.

While there was much debate over what the special verdict form
was to say, there was no objection following the Court's ruling and
prior to the jury retiring.

Moreover, even if the Court gives

JENSEN v. IHC HOSPITALS
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weight to defendants' claim that they previously objected to the
verdict form, it was not the same question they now argue should
have been given.
Finally, the verdict form which was adopted by the Court was
taken directly from the Supreme Court decision in Jensen v. IHC
wherein the court stated

NN

[t]he issue before the their of fact in

this case is whether attorney Forgette discovered or reasonably
should have discovered the legal injury done to Shelly Hipwell
before December 16, 1989."
contrary,

this verdict

Despite defendants' argument to the

clearly

incorporates

the

standard

of a

reasonable attorney.
As to the testimony of Humphreys, after reviewing the record,
the Court is persuaded it was consistent with the instructions and
the verdict form given to the jury by the Court.

Indeed, based

upon the instruction regarding legal injury, Humphreys opined that
a reasonable attorney would not have discovered the legal injury
done to Shelly Hipwell prior to December 16, 1989.

Moreover,

whether Humphreys' expert opinion was credible was for defendants
to argue and the jury to decide.
Based

upon

the

forgoing,

Defendants'

Motion

Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, in the Alternative, for a New
Trial is denied.
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/ day of February, 2000,

GLENN K. IWASXKI
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FILES DISTRICT GGUBT
Third Judicial District

SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL, individually and on
behalf of all other heirs of
SHELLY HIPWELL, and ASHLEY
MICHELE HIPWELL and KAYCIE
SHAYLENE HIPWELL appearing by
SHAYNE HIPWELL as guardian ad
litem,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

AY 1 9 2000
Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No.

920904182 CV

Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI
Court Clerk: Janet Banks
May 19, 2000

IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAYDEE HOSPITAL, and MICHAEL J.
HEALY, M.D. and DOES I THROUGH
X,
Defendants,

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and Defendants' Joint Motion
to Confirm Dismissal of Fraud Claims.

The Court heard oral

argument with respect to the motions on May 15, 2000.

Following

the hearing, the matters were taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the
following ruling.
With their Fourth Amended Complaint, plaintiffs seek to amend

JENSEN v. IHC
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"fraud/fraudulent

concealment"

and

constructive fraud claims against Dr. Healy and IHC on the theory
that Dr. Healy acted as an agent of, or in privity with, IHC.
Defendants jointly oppose the motion and seek dismissal of
plaintiffs' fraud claims arguing the Supreme Court has already
ruled that plaintiffs cannot "proceed on their separate claims for
common law fraud."
331 (Utah 1997).

Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327,

Accordingly, it is defendants' position dismissal

is appropriate.
Plaintiffs in opposition to defendants' motion argue what the
Supreme Court rejected were not their causes of action for fraud,
but instead, plaintiffs' contention that a three year statute of
limitations, rather than a two year statute of limitations, should
apply to them.

According to plaintiffs, the issue of damages

caused by the defendants' fraud has never been before the Supreme
Court of Utah.
After reviewing the record in this matter, as well as the
Jensen decision, the Court is persuaded defendants are correct in
their analysis of the Supreme Court's decision.

Indeed, despite

some rather contradictory dicta, it is clear the Supreme Court in
Jensen rejected
claim.

the existence of plaintiffs' independent

fraud

Notably, the Supreme Court stated the following in its

original opinion:
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Shelly's family argues that it has made a
general fraud claim and a constructive fraud
claim in addition to, and distinct from, their
claims of fraudulent concealment discussed
above. However, we can find nothing in their
allegation of fraud or constructive fraud that
is in any way different from their claims of
frciudulent concealment. All the allegations
raised by Shelly!s family surround their claim
that Dr. Healy acted to divert the family! s
attention away from his alleged malpractice
whem he had a duty to disclose the facts of
his relationship with attorneys Healy and
Sharp. The only damages arising out of
Shcslly' s family! s claims
for
fraud
and
constructive fraud relate to the possibility
that they were prevented from discovering the
facts constituting their claim for medical
malpractice. While we acknowledge that there
may be cases where a doctor commits fraud on a
patient in a way that would not be covered by
the medical malpractice act's fraudulent
concealment provision, this is not such a
case. Given the specific facts alleged in this
case, we cannot agree that Shellyf s family's
fraud claim amounts to anything more than or
is different from a claim of fraudulent
concealment of medical malpractice.
See
Gillman v. Department of Fin. Inst., 7 82 P. 2d
506, 509, 511-12
(Utah 1989)
(rejecting
attempts to recast claim for damages arising
out of regulators' licensing decision as claim
for
negligence
to
avoid
governmental
immunity).
Id. at 336. (Emphasis added).
Based upon this wording, it is apparent the Supreme Court
intended to allow allegations of fraud to continue in this case
only to the extent they related

to the fraudulent

concealment

JENSEN v. IHC
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provisions of the medical malpractice statute of limitations.

1

Indeed, their citing of the Gillman case seems to confirm this.
Finally, a review of this Court's Memorandum Decision makes
clear that the issues before it at that time were limited solely to
the issue of whether plaintiffs had pled allegations of agency and
privity sufficient to toll the statute of limitations against IHC.
Indeed, the Court specifically stated:
With this motion, defendant contends Dr.
Healy's alleged fraud does not toll the
statute
of
limitations
because
(1)
as
recognized by the Supreme Court, plaintiffs'
complaint makes no allegations either that Dr.
Healy was the agent of McKay-Dee or that he
acted to further the aims of McKay Dee; (2)
Dr. Healy was, in fact, not an agent of McKay
Dee because, as noted in the case of Tolman v.
IHC Hospitals, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 382 (D. Utah
C D . 1986), an independently acting "physician
could not act as agent of the hospital"; and
(3) even if Dr. Healy had been McKay-Dee's
agent, his fraudulent concealment was not
within the scope of his agency.
Indeed,
asserts defendant, as noted in the affidavit
of Thomas Hanrahan, Dr. Healy's fraudulent
actions would have been contrary to McKayDee's interest to review, evaluate, and
correct patient care problems through its
quality improvement program.

In light of the forgoing, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend is
denied and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Independent
Fraud

Claims

lr

is granted.

Counsel

for defendants

is asked to

The fraudulent concealment claim has been mooted by the
recent jury verdict.
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prepare the appropriate order,
DATED this / V

day of May, 2000,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483)
KURT M. FRANKENBURG (A5279)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D.
257 East 200 Soudi, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678

P

Thlw D , , S J f i l C T C 0 «RT
TWrd Judicial District

JAMES W GILSON (A1197)
SCOTT C. PUGLSEY (A2662)
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.
36 Soudi State Street, Suite 2200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 533.8282
RICHARD W CASEY (A0590)
ANDREW G DEISS (A7184)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER & PETERSON
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc.
170 S. Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. dba McKay-Dee Hospital
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE HIPWELL,
individually and on behalf of all other heirs of
Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley Michele Hipwell and
Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell appearing by Shayne
Hipwell as Guardian Ad Litem,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS
FRAUD CLAIMS

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 920904182CV
v.
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAY-DEE
HOSPITAL; MICHAEL J. HEALY, M.D. and
DOES I through X,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs5 Motion to Amend Complaint and Defendants3 Joint Motion to Confirm
Dismissal of Fraud Claims came on for hearing before the Court on May 15, 2000,
pursuant to proper notice. Plaintiffs were represented by Richard D. Burbidge and Simon
H. Forgette. Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. was represented by Richard C. Casey, James
W Gilson and Andrew G. Deiss. Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D. was represented by
Elliott J. Williams and Kurt M. Frankenburg.
The Court reviewed die motions, memoranda, and supporting materials on file, and
heard oral argument by counsel for plaintiffs and defendants. Having taken die matter
under advisement, and having subsequently issued its written Memorandum Decision,
dated May 19, 2000, which is incorporated herein by reference, and good cause appearing
therefor, the Court hereby ORDERS that:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, requesting leave to file a Fourth Amended
Complaint, is denied.
2. Defendants' Motion to dismiss plaintiffs5 fraud claims is granted. All of
plaintiffs5 claims set forth under die Second Cause of Action and Third Cause of Action, of
the Third Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
3. The date of this Order shall be deemed the effective date of the Court's
Memorandum Decision.

DATED this

day of

% ^

2000.

BY THE

GLENN K. IWASAJK? 2{A$%ml j*- 't
District Court Judge \ <?*&*!/(&/'
Approved as to Form:
BURJ3ID
By:
RICHARD D. B
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

80666.1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL, individually, and on
behalf of all other heirs of
Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley
Michelle Hipwell and Kaycie
Shaylene Hipwell appearing by
Shayne Hipwell as Guardian Ad
Litem,

'

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 920904182CV
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI

Plaintiffs,
Court Clerk: Janet Banks
vs.
March 21, 2001
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKay- Dee Hospital, MICHAEL J. HEALY, j
M.D., and DOES I through X.
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
several pretrial motions.

The Court heard oral argument with

respect to the motions on March 21, 2001.

Following the hearing,

the Court ruled from the bench with respect to all motions, except
Plaintiffs' Motion to Allow Evidence of Admissions by Conduct on
the Part of Defendant Dr. Healy and Defendants' Joint Motion in
Limine to Exclude Selected Testimony of Dr. Greggory DeVore and Dr.
Barry Schifirin.
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits

JENSEN v. IHC HOSPITALS

Page 2

MINUTE ENTRY

attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the
following ruling.
Turning first to plaintiffs' motion, as an initial matter, the
Court finds that dismissal of plaintiffs' fraud claim does not
render inadmissible probative evidence that Dr. Healy obstructed
justice as regards a potential medical malpractice claim against
him by Shelly Hipwell.
This having been said, the parties do not dispute the law in
Utah is that wrongdoing by a party "amounting to an obstruction of
justice," can be regarded as an admission by conduct. See State v.
Garcia, 663 P.12d 60, 65 (Utah 1993) (citing McCormick's handbook
of the Law of Evidence, § 273 at 660 (2d ed. 1972).

Applying the

aforementioned to the facts in the record, the Court finds a jury
could reasonably conclude Dr. Healy obstructed justice regarding a
potential medical malpractice claim against him.
plaintiffs' motion

is granted

to the extent

Accordingly,

plaintiffs have

evidence of Dr. Healy's direct conduct from which a reasonable
inference

could

be

drawn

that

such

conduct

amounted

to an

obstruction of justice.
With respect to defendants' joint motion regarding Drs. DeVore
and Schifirin, assuming proper qualifications and the laying of
sufficient foundation, the Court finds these individuals qualified
to testify regarding the matters at issue.

With specific regard,
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however, to testimony addressing Ms. Hipwell's emergency room care,
the Court finds Drs. DeVore and Schifirin are not qualified to
testify regarding her treatment during triage stages, specifically,
prior

to

her

being

diagnosed

as

needing

obstetric

care.

Accordingly, forgoing any new information regarding these doctors'
qualifications, their testimony will be limited in this manner.
Finally, the Court, although aware of the potential need to
rebut a credibility attack, admonishes the parties to mindful in
avoiding the use of cumulative and duplicative testimony.
This Minute Entry constitutes the Order regarding the matters
addressed herein.

No further order is required.
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MR. FISHLER:

Objection, foundation.

Can I be heard,

your Honor?
THE COURT:

Do you want to voir dire?

Do you want to

voir dire?
MR. FISHLER:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Okay, go ahead.

And your objection is foundation as to the statement
about if the patient were sent from the emergency room with a
complaint?
MR. BURBIDGE:

It's just simply saying if she were

sent the record would be there.
MR. FISHLER:

Well, then I may have misunderstood.
Okay, well, I ! 11 allow you —

THE COURT:

was that

the nature of your objection?
MR. FISHLER:

He f s talking about whether or not the

record would be available to the emergency department.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. FISHLER:

And so you may voir dire.

Thank you, your Honor.

VOIR DIRE EX^MINATICN
BY MR. FISHIER:
Q
a moment.

Good morning, Dr. DeVore.

Dr. DeVore, let me back up

Are you board certified in internal medicine?

A

No.

Q

You testified earlier that you were an internist or

•3Q1

1

had an internship; is that correct?

2

A

Yes, sir.

3

Q

That was one year of training, correct?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And people that practice internal medicine go on to

6

more years of training and then they take the internal medicine

7

boards, correct?

8

MR. BURBIDGE:

9

THE COURT:

Objection, irrelevant, your Honor.

Yeah, I want you to concentrate on your

10

objection and your voir dire pursuant to your objection.

11

based, as I understand it, on foundation of his inability to

12

opine as to what records may or may not be available in the

13

emergency room.

14

MR. FISHLER:

15

THE COURT:

16
17

Q

It's

All right.
Okay.

(BY MR. FISHLER)

Are you board certificated in

emergency medicine?

18

A

No, sir.

19

Q

Are there boards that emergency physicians can take?

20

A

I believe so, yes.

21

Q

Have you ever sat for the American College of

22

Emergency Physician Boards?

23

A

No.

24

Q

Are you qualified to sit for the American College of

25

Emergency Physician Boards?

A

No.

2

Q

Do you feel that you have sufficient training to take

3

the boards?
A

In emergency medicine?

Q

Yes.

A

No.

Q

Do you know what training is required of a —

an

applicant who wants to take the boards?
A

I don f t know -- I do not know the specifics.
MR. BURBIDGE:

My only objection here, your Honor

is

what we talked about is where the record would be and whether
they would be accessible.

It would have to be -- it goes to

his knowledge of where the records were and who could access
them.
THE COURT:

That very well

MR. BURBIDGE:

—

I didn't get into who might want to or

why they wouldn ' t.
THE COURT:

That very well may be your response, but

right now I'm going to allow Mr. Fishier some leeway.
MR. BURBIDGE:
Q

Okay, thank you, Judge.

(BY MR. FISHLER)

back up a moment.

Are you familiar with —

let me

Are you familiar with what we call ACEP?

A

No.

Q

Do you know if ACEP stands for the American College

of Emergency Physicians?

Does that sound right to you?
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A

You just told me that, so I believe you.

Q

Okay.

And do you know if they have guidelines much

as ACOG has guidelines?
A

Well, I don't -- as I'm not a member of that nor have

I participated, I would make the general statement that as ACOG
has guidelines for us as obstetricians and gynecologists, I
would assume that other professional organizations would have
guidelines.
Q

And most members of ACEP would follow the ACEP

guidelines and most members of ACOG would follow the ACOG
guidelines?
A

I can't speak to that.

Q

Okay.

Have you ever applied for privileges to work

as an emergency physician, not a consultant in an emergency
department?
A

No.

Q

In the last —

okay.

And have you ever become

familiar with any of the texts, journals, or treatises,
literature involving emergency medicine?
A

Only in the sense that as it relates to pregnancy

complications.
Q

Are you current -- currently taking any continuing

medical education courses in the field of emergency medicine?
A

No.

Q

Have you published any literature or books in the

1QA

1
2

field of emergency medicine?

A

I have.

Q

And what was the name of the book and what was the

name of the topic?
A

It was a -- it was an article published in Obstetrics

Gynecology that involved the care of patients appearing in the
emergency room with what's called dysfunctional uterine
bleeding.

And it actually has become one of the classic

articles on the use of hormones to stop bleeding in the
emergency room environment in patients who present for that
Q

All right.

And what was the date of the publication?

A

That was in the early -- late 80s.

Q

All right.

A

Yes.

Q

When you worked in an emergency room, I think you

Was that more than ten years ago?

told us back at Yale, did the emergency department have a
full-blown emergency staff much like LDS Hospital or Cottonwood
or the University would have?
A

The emergency room staff was —

they did not have

emergency room physicians as we do today.
Q

All right.

So when you were working as a resident

some 20 years ago in emergency departments, since that time how
emergency departments are staffed, how they function, how they
are trained is totally different, correct?
A

Yes.

385

1

Q

Do you know if at McKay-Dee Hospital there are any

2

written guidelines concerning organizing liver function tests

3

for the emergency department?

4

A

I don't know if there are any.

5

Q

In your preparation to be here today, have you

I don't know.

6

reviewed any literature involving emergency medicine standard

7

of care?
A

No.

Q

Are you familiar with the ethical professional

requirements of the American College of Emergency Physicians
requires that if one is to testify against an emergency
physician they need to be a board certified emergency
physician?
MR. BURBIDGE:
THE COURT:

Objection, foundation.

Yeah, and you're getting a little far

afield, Mr. Fishier.

I want to concentrate and get your

attention back on your original objection.

The original

objection, and I think that you have laid adequate foundation
for the objection, the original objection was foundation as to
how he would know what records go to the emergency room and
that's about it.
MR. FISHLER:
THE COURT:

All right.

And I think that you've laid that as the

foundation.
MR. FISHLER:

I think if your Honor says I'm done,

•3Q£

1

I'm done.

2
3

THE COURT:

Thank you.

May I hear a response from

Mr. Burbidge.

4

MR. BURBIDGE:

Yeah.

It never came out.

He was just

5

saying that the records were over at labor and delivery and

6

could be accessed.

7

the ER room.

8

ER room.

9

He didn't indicate that they were going to

I don't have any indication they ever went to the

Nor did I want to withdraw that testimony from him.
THE COURT:

As I understand his answer, his answer

10

was so that it would be available for the emergency room.

11

that how you

12
13

—

MR. BURBIDGE:

I had for anybody that wanted to

access them.

14
15

Is

THE COURT:

Is that how you read the answer —

I mean

how you took the answer, Mr. Fishier?

16

MR. FISHLER:

Yes.

The question is how would he know

17

that the ER could get over to labor and delivery and access the

18

records?

He doesn't.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. FISHLER:

21

Yeah, that's the nut of your objection.
That's the nut of the objection.

Lacking that information, I don't think he can testify.

22

THE COURT:

Let me hear the response on that.

23

MR. BURBIDGE:

Well, the response is this, if he's

24

the director of obstetric services at IHC and if he's located

25

right there and the records are at labor and delivery, he can

tell us whether or not somebody has access if they want.

Now,

whether they want it or why they want it is a different issue
and I haven ! t gotten there.
THE COURT:

Okay.

The objection will be sustained as

far as the answer in the discreet way in which it was answered,
that they are at labor and delivery for the possibility of
having others have access to those records.

And that's as far

as we got.
MR. BURBIDGE:
THE COURT:

Fair enough.

Okay.

The other testimony regarding

qualifications on emergency room may or may not be addressed
for other argument later.
MR. BURBIDGE:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Okay, thank you.

Go ahead.

MR. BURBIDGE:

Thanks.

DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
BY MR. BURBIDGE:
Q

I just want to reconnect with you.

The prenatal

records, Dr. Healy's prenatal records go over to labor and
delivery November 29th, 1988, right?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Let me ask you this, from the prenatal records

that were sent over, is there any way for anyone to look at
that and say we know exactly when she'll give birth?
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A

Yes, you have.

Q

Okay.

So let me ask you this as well, is there

—

let -- first of all, are there nurses' notes and physician
notes as well?
A

Yes.

Q

All right.

And have you extracted those both nurses

notes and physician notes?
A

I have.

Q

Okay.

Would you put those up so we can look at those

and explain what, if any, significance to the obstetric patient
these have.
MR. FISHLER:

Objection, your Honor.

May we approach

the bench?
THE COURT:

As I understand the -- well, let me let

the jury go and we'll talk about this because I have some ideas
myself.
So members of the jury, as you go to your second
break of the day, please remember my admonitions.
discuss this matter with anyone.
discuss it with you.

Do not

Do not allow anyone to

Please do not form or express any opinion

on the matter until it is siibmitted to you for your decision.
The jury is excused, the rest of us will remain in
session.

We will reconvene with the jury at noon.
(The following proceedings were held in open court
out of the presence of the jury.)

•PQC;

THE COURT:

The record will show - - b e seated.

The

record will show that we remain in session outside the presence
of the jury to hear argument.
Mr. Fishier, your objection?
MR. FISHLER:

My objection is r your Honor, is he' s

going to the emergency room records.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. FISHLER:

I don't believe he 1 s qualified to

testify as a standard of care emergency room physician.

Now,

if that is true, what's significant in there is irrelevant.

It

may be significant to him, but he hasn't linked it up as being
significant to the ER physician.

So I don't see how it's

admissible.
THE COURT:

All right.

And I don't -- and I don't

know if it's premature or not, but I heard the question being
what is in the charts that's significant to an OB-GYN and
that's all he's saying.
to go right now.

And that's as far as I'm allowing it

I have yet to hear the question has there

been any breach of any emergency room standards.
you're going to jump up.

And then

But all the question is, was it not,

Mr. Burbidge, from P-l, 325, 326 and 317, from those records,
what is significant to an OB-GYN?
MR. BURBIDGE:

What information is significant to an

obstetric patient, I'm talking about the patient right now.
THE COURT:

I'm sorry.

*3Q£

1

MR. BURBIDGE:

But let me just finish.

I don't think

2

I've been put through this screen by defense counsel like this.

3

Dr. DeVore is going to testify that information was

4

developed -- he's not going to go into triage, I don't care how

5

the ER guy does triage, I don't know if he does this first,

6

second or whatever.

7

certain information was gathered at that ER visit that sometody

8

had to act on.

9

say based upon his experience in an ER -- and he doesn't have

But Dr. DeVore is going to testify that

Now if they want to say -- and he's going tc

10

to be a board certified ER, he's an obstetrician, he's

11

practiced in ERs, he's interfaced with ERs on obstetric

12

patients.

13

you get that, I don't care how you do the triage, but when you

14

get that kind of information, you can't sit on it.

15

act on it on an obstetric patient.

16

And he's going it say there has to be a follow-up with an

17

obstetrician.

18

do anything with this patient.

19

be.

20

followed up.

21

and the jury can draw whatever inference they want from that.

22

Somebody had to follow-up.

23

atmosphere.

He's going to testify that the standard of care when

You have to

Then it says follow-up.

We're not asking the labor and delivery guy to
As a matter of fact, shouldn't

But somebody has to follow-up.

We don't know if he

We do know that ER record is in Dr. Healy's file

24

MR. FISHLER:

25

THE COURT:

It doesn't just go into the

Your Honor
Go ahead.

—

1

MR. FISHLER:

The moment he says that given this

2

information the ER physician has an obligation to do something,

3

he's testifying as to the standard of care of an ER physician.

4

That's the problem.

5

THE COURT:

And I agree with you on that.

6

that what you're asking, Mr. Burbidge?

7

that.

8
9
10

MR. BURBIDGE:

But is

I didn't hear you say

Well, here is the problem.

What we're

getting into, here is an obstetric patient that comes into the
ER, right, and certain information is gathered about her.

11

THE COURT:

Right.

12

MR. BURBIDGE:

Right.

Now, this particular

13

individual is director of maternal fetal medicine, so a

14

vertically-integrated program, I've laid foundation for that.

15

Visits all aspects, watches patients through all, understands

16

the custom and practice, what's supposed to be done with

17

obstetric information about obstetric patients.

18

have to be an ER physician to know that the custom and

19

practice, and it was uniform throughout all the major hospitals

20

including the IHC facility, that if that kind of information is

21

generated in an ER, however it's generated, once it's generated

22

on an obstetric patient, somebody has to act on it.

23

just sit there and nobody do anything.

24

THE COURT:

And that's —

25

his objection, who acts on it.

He doesn't

It can't

and that's the essence of

It has to be the emergency

—

1

if he says it has to be the emergency room physician who acts

2

on it, that opinion is not going to be allowed.

3

opinion he has a lack of foundation on the emergency room.

4

MR. BURBIDGE:

Okay, let me do this.

Because in my

This in your

5

prior ruling, what you said is I'm -- in written ruling I'm not

6

going to let you go into ER triage.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BURBIDGE:

9

Right.
Until it's determined that we have an

obstetric patient on our hands, something like that.

10

THE COURT:

Right.

11

MR. BURBIDGE:

Now, in this record there is a

12

reference to follow-up with Dr. Healy.

13

going to come in and he's going to say, well, what I really

14

meant by that, and I'm not buying it for a minute, is was I

15

expected Shelly to take the platelet count and go over and

16

explain all this.

17

he followed up with Dr. Healy, okay?

18

he get important obstetric information?

19

with Dr. Healy so he clearly recognized —

20

to follow-up with Dr. Healy.

21

patient to Dr. Healy or he's supposed to follow-up himself or

22

both, we know there's a recognition.

23

Now, this ER doctor is

Okay, there's a reference in the record that
Now, the question is, did
We know he followed up
there's a reference

So whether he's sending the

All I'm trying to extract here is he got obstetrical

24

information, there's a reference to follow-up, whether he dxd

25

or not it should happen.

Now, I have got it in the record that

1

he did it or that there's a reference to a follow-up.

2

question is, is there information there that's important

3

obstetrically.

4

MR. FISHLER:

And the

He's wrong, Judge, there is nothing in

5

the record.

It says F-U Healy and he's got his interpretation

6

on it, I've got my interpretation on it.

7

call Dr. King and we're going to go to the horse's mouth.

8

yet there's nothing in the record that unequivocally says there

9

was to be a follow-up.

And we're going to
As

His argument that this man is at the

10

top of some vertical organization and therefore can comment on

11

everything down below -- CEO, we only need one witness, Judge,

12

we need the CEO of IHC and he'll tell us everything.

13

doesn't make sense.

14
15

It

The problem is is medicine is not a vertical
situation, it's horizontal.

16

MR. BURBIDGE:

17

THE COURT:

If you

—

I think Mr. Williams has not had an

18

opportunity to add his objection.

19

MR. WILLIAMS:

Thank you, your Honor.

My objection

20

is based on relevance.

There is no evidence at all that

21

Dr. Healy was advised of the ER visit on the 12th.

22

any information from the ER visit on the 12th.

23

relevance to the observations he has about the obstetric

24

condition in the emergency room unless that information was

25

given to Dr. Healy, and there will be no testimony establishing

That he had

There is no

400

that.
MR. BUKBIDGE:
THE COURT:

One more.

Okay.

MR. BURBIDGE:

In the ER record it says follow-up

with Dr. Healy, okay?
THE COURT:

Well, F U, or follow-up.

MR. BURBIDGE:

That's what it means.

so we can interpret that.

Doctors do that

Now, that's just a plain record, it

sits there, it's in evidence.

Now Dr. King after the fact is

going to come in and put a spin on it, but it sits there.
jury can interpret that one way or the other.

The

Dr. DeVore will

say physician does a plan, it's typical that the physician
follows up with the plan.

But however that may be, one way or

the other, that emergency physician recognized he had an
obstetric patient.

Either his plan was to follow-up himself or

have the patient follow-up with Dr. Healy.

Okay?

Important obstetric information was gathered.
doesnf t have to treat her.
when they treat them.

He

I don't know what ER doctors do

But that follow-up with Dr. Healy

needed, either through the patient or directly or both, needed
to convey the obstetric information that was obtained.
the .only reason for that follow-up.

That's

If he -- if it was just a

cut on the hand, there's no reason to follow-up with anybody,
you just patch it up and we're gone.
talking about.

That's what they're

But we have a high-risk obstetrics patient now.

401

And the ER doctor has a reference to either the patient or him
following up or both and all I wanted -- all I'm going to go
through is is there information here that should have been part
of that follow-up, that narrow.
THE COURT:

That should have been part of that

follow-up?
MR. BURBIDGE:
MR. FISHLER:

Right.
The question is that he keeps doing it,

he says -- he says that Dr. DeVore says the follow-up in an ER
means this.

Dr. DeVore can't -- with all due respect, Doctor.

I don't believe he can do that.
THE COURT:

Sure.

point and that's the —

I agree with Mr. Fishier on that

that's going to be the ruling.

However, I will allow you to illicit testimony from Dr. DeVore
as to what is contained in the emergency room records as of
11/29/88 as you have referenced that is significant to an
obstetric patient.

And that's it.

MR. BURBIDGE:
THE COURT:
the follow-up.

Okay.

And whatever -- and his explanation of

But not that it should have been -- this

information should have been given to them because that is the
part of the ruling today and my other ruling in which I find
that he was not qualified to testify about what emergency room
physicians ought to be doing up until that time that he is
consult -- m

as a consultant himself for an obstetric patient.

40?

1

called immediately when the results are available and he or she

2

should be at the patient's bedside within minutes to evaluate

3

that patient.

4

Q

Okay.

5

isn't paid?

6

A

And what can happen if that kind of attention

Because you're in a very dangerous area with low

—

7

this degree of low platelets, you can have spontaneous bleeding

8

that can occur in the liver or the brain.

9

Q

Okay.

Now let's look at the records starting in the

10

morning, if we can, of December 14th, 1988.

11

with the nurses' notes, if we can, which is 226-B.

12
13

THE COURT:

And we'll start

Why don't you save that for our afternoon

session.

14

MR. BURBIDGE:

15

THE COURT:

Sure, I'd be happy to, Judge.

Members of the jury, as you go to your

16

last break, please remember my admonitions.

Do not discuss

17

this matter with anyone.

18

with you.

19

matter until it's submitted to you for your decision.

20

is excused.

21

us will stay in session.

Do not allow anyone to discuss it

Please do not form or express an opinion on the

We'll try to call you back by 1:30.

The jury

The rest of

22

(The following proceedings were held in open court

23

out of the presence of the jury.)

24

THE COURT:

25

Please be seated.

The record will show

that we remain in session outside the presence of the jury.

1

Pursuant to a discussion at side-bar and my ultimately

2

sustaining the objection as to lack of foundation regarding

3

Dr. DeVore's opinion as to what emergency room physicians

4

should do, Mr. Burbidge requested an opportunity to proffer and

5

I will allow him the opportunity to proffer what the evidence

6

might have been.

7

should not be let in.

And I will hear further argument as to why it

MR. BURBIDGE:

Thank you, your Honor, I appreciate

the convenience of the record.

We believe that the record has

shown here that Dr. DeVore is eminently qualified to testify as
to the standard of care for anyone, any physician acting in the
emergency room dealing with an obstetric patient with these
presentations because she presents an obstetric problem.
has practiced in the ER.
ER.

He

He has practiced obstetrics in the

He has observed the ER practice in a number of major

hospitals, including those in the IHC system.
There's a uniform standard of care when obstetric
18

| patients appear with these symptomatology, however you got to
them or however the ER doctor under Intermountain Health Care
got to them, once he understood that she is an eclampsia
patient and he has these findings, it must be acted on.
Whether he does it or she does it or it's referred over to
someone else who is going to act on them, the standard of care
is uniform.

ER doctors simply do not treat or deal with

obstetric patients with these findings with themselves.
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And

1

follow-up is mandatory and that's what he would say.

2

observed it, he's seen it, he's dealt with it, he's taught it,

3

he's learned it.

4

that one narrow area.

And he's qualified to talk about it just on

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Burbidge.

MR. FISHLER:

Mr. Fishier.

Your Honor, to recount the voir dire,

he is not board certified in emergency medicine.
board eligible.

He's

He's not even

He doesn't have any -- had any training it in.

He has never had privileges to work in an emergency department.
When he did work in an emergency department back at Yale it was
25 years ago.

He's not familiar with any of the definitions of

the American College of Emergency Physicians.
applied for privileges.

He's never

He doesn't subscribe to any journals.

He doesn't do current medical education in it.
know who the leading authorities are.

He doesn't even

He's got his view of the

way an emergency physician should handle OB patients.

There's

no one here that's an ER doc to say, no, that's what OB's do,
that's not what we do.
He last worked in an emergency department some 25
years ago.

If they wanted to take on emergency medicine

aspects of this case, they very well could have retained an
emergency medicine physician.
we —

But to make this stretch and if

it's improper if you look at the case, and I have the

citation here, it's not to be -THE COURT:

Well, remember, I ruled in your favor,
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and so

—
MR. FISHLER:

2

Yes, it's an IQ test.

Your Honor,

3

there's a lot of things I won't take, but one of them is a

4

hint.

5

MR. BURBIDGE:

Let me just conclude and then we'll be

6

done.

7

in each instance when the Court said that a doctor in one area

8

can't testify as to a standard of care in another area, they

9

simply said you have to lay a foundation that he's familiar.

I read those cases too and it's really interesting that

10

He doesn't even have to have practiced there.

11

fact, one of the leading cases never done the operation, never

12

done the procedure, but could testify about how it could be

13

done because he learned it, seen it, taught it.

14

we're saying.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BURBIDGE:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. FISHLER:

20

THE COURT:

22

And that's all

All right.
Okay.

All right.

Both sides have had the

convenience of the record and my ruling still remains.

19

21

As a matter of

denied you.

One other.
You asked for a side-bar conference, I

And what is it now, Mr. Fishier?

MR. FISHLER:

I've got so many people handing me

23

paper here.

24

that someone in labor and delivery should have ordered a test.

25

I don't know if it was a platelets or an LFT.

My objection, Judge, was that Dr. DeVore testified

He said it was a
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1

deviation from the standard of care for L and D not to order

2

that test.

3

objected because this is an opinion that has never been

4

revealed to the defense to date.

5

his affidavit he sets forth all of his complaints against the

6

various defendants.

7

doesn't mention this.

8

he is asked, Have you told us all of the complaints you have?

9

And he said, It's all set forth in the affidavit.

10

And I objected not because of foundation, but I

We have his affidavit and in

As we looked through the affidavit it
Then in his deposition, his deposition

Your Honor's suggestion that somehow —

and I'll read

11

the question, "What I want to find out is are there any other

12

criticisms that you have of medical negligence that are not

13

contained in the affidavit?

14

more elaborations and in more detail of those two points, and

15

actually a third in the transfer of the patient to the

16

University of Utah, which I think is contained in the

17

affidavit.

I would -- Answer:

I would do

18

The problem with handling it on cross-examination,

19

Judge, is I get up and cross-examine him and I'm going to go

20

something like this:

21

He'll say, two days ago.

22

have?

23

counter expert witness to counter this.

24

that jury is is his opinion is no good, folks, because he just

25

came up with it two days ago.

When did you come up with that opinion?
What further cross-examination do I

I'm not prepared to examine him.

I haven't called a
So all I can say to

That's all I can do on cross.

1

It's got to be excluded.

2

THE COURT:

And

3

MR. BURBIDGE:

4

THE COURT:

—
Judge --

And I'm not going to exclude it.

And I

5

have much more faith in your cross-examination techniques than

6

you apparently do in your own.

7

Mr . Burbidge.

But let me hear from

8

MR. BURBIDGE:

9

MR. FISHLER: -Well, thank you, your Honor.

10

MR. BURBIDGE:

I will.

His deposition was taken twice so they

11

mix, you know, statements made by Dr. DeVore in each one of

12

those, that he indicated that he's reviewing all the medical

13

records, there may be some elaborations on points.

14

testified that those tests should have been taken earlier.

15

they didn't follow-up and say, well, who should have taken them

16

and what personnel or what department.

17

testified that when she appeared in labor and delivery those

18

tests should have been taken based on the information they had.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. BURBIDGE:

21
22
23
24
25

And he also
Now

But he has already

I've ruled, thank you.
I know you have.

You invited and I

took the opportunity.
THE COURT:

We're going to come back at 25 to by this

clock and then we're out of here at 2:30.
MR. FISHLER:

The Court doesn't give comp time

because of how late we worked yesterday?

461

1
2

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

3

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

4

RLEDDSTOCTCGUKT

5

Third Judicial District

SHERRY JENSEN AND SHAYNE
HIPWELL, et al

)

6
Plaintiffs,

)

AUG 0 ! 2(

By

t> ^ Q \ry

1

NV

Deputy Ctenc

VS •
8
9

IHC HOSPITALS, INC , dba
MCKAY-DEE HOSPITAL, MICHAEL
J. HEALY, M.D., et al.,

10
Defendants.

CASE NO. 920904182
)
) Jury Trial
)
(VOLUME Villi of XII)
)

11
12
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI
13
14

SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE

15

450 SOUTH STATE STREET

16

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-1860

17
18
REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
19
APRIL 9, 2001
20
21
22
23
24
25

REPORTED BY:

Jody Edwards, CSR, RPR, RMR, CRR
238-7378

THE COURT:

1
2

P 20 will be the compilation of the

Plaintiffs' demonstrative exhibits.
MR. BURBIDGE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

And we have a

set prepared for your Honor and a set prepared for defense
counsel.

And I'll hand that to the clerk.

And with that, your

Honor, we rest.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Burbidge.

And as a

comment on Plaintiffs' 20, the Court will reserve any ruling as
to whether or not the demonstrative exhibits will accompany the
jury and the Court -- I mean into the jury room.
still marked for further review of —

If not, it is

appellate review if

necessary.
MR. BURBIDGE:

Thank you very much.

THE COURT:

With the plaintiff resting

—

MR. CASEY:

Your Honor, we just want to reserve the

right -- we'll take a look at the compilation and let you know
if it's accurate.
THE COURT:

Plaintiff having rested, defense.

MR. CASEY:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

We'd like to move

for --

another matter of law.

Members of the jury, this is

I'm going to excuse you momentarily

while I take argument and hear the position of the parties.

As

you go to this early break, please remember my admonitions to
you.

Do not discuss this matter with anyone.

Do not allow

17S8

anyone to discuss it with you.

Please do not form or express

any opinion on the matter until it is submitted to you for your
decision. I'll try not to keep you out too long.

Please rise

for the jury.
(The following proceedings were held in open court
out of the presence of the jury.)
THE COURT:

Be seated.

The record will show that we

remain in session outside the presence of the jury.

The

plaintiff having rested, motions by the defense.
MR. CASEY:

Yes, your Honor, thank you.

Your Honor, may I approach?
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. CASEY:

Your Honor, we would like to submit to

the Court a motion for partial directed verdict.
counsel with a copy.
filed with the Court.
THE COURT:

I'll provide

And if need be we'll make sure it gets
With the clerk's office, your Honor.
Well, you can file it with my clerk and

my clerk will stamp it.

Is this the original?

MR. CASEY:

That's the original, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right, then just remind me that I

have the original.
MR. CASEY:

Okay.
Very briefly, your Honor, the grounds of

the motion are primarily twofold.

When this case started the

plaintiffs had three general areas of alleged negligence that
was asserted against McKay-Dee Hospital.

The first was the

1 7SQ

emergency room.

The second was the ICU.

transfer to the University Hospital.

And the third was the

The plaintiffs sought to

prove all three elements of the negligence claim through their
expert testimony of Dr. DeVore, and that was basically it.
As this Court is aware, Dr. DeVore's proffered
testimony with respect to the emergency room at McKay-Dee and
the care provided therein was precluded under Rule 702, and
properly precluded.
Furthermore, with respect to Dr. DeVore's proffered
testimony with respect to the standard of care that would apply
to Dr. Baughman's involvement in the decision to transfer the
patient to the University Hospital and whether his concurrence
in that decision constituted a breach of whatever standard of
care would be applicable, the Court also precluded the
testimony of Dr. DeVore properly under Rule 702.
Your Honor, in both of those instances that was the
only evidence offered by the plaintiffs with respect to any
alleged breach of the standard of care in the emergency room
and with respect to the transfer.

We think it is very

important that this Court make this decision at this time to
clarify what's going forward with respect to the claims against
McKay-Dee Hospital.

There has been a lot of confusion put in

this record with respect to what claims are being asserted
against whom.

And that confusion was only exacerbated during

opening argument and during the examination of Dr. DeVore, both

1 7Q0

1

with the objections to lack of foundation and the Court's

2

rulings.

3

parties and for the Court and the jury that this directed

4

verdict motion be considered and granted.

5

And I think it's going to be important that for the

Secondly, in part of -- well, as part of the Court's

6

decision if it so deems that the motion should be granted or

7

even if it deems at this time that it shouldn't, we think that

8

appropriate jury instructions should be provided to the Court

9

so the jury is made clear that those claims are out of this

10

case and that the jury is not asked to speculate about what

11

came in from Dr. DeVore and what didn't come in.

12

with this type of confusion the jury could be misled and I

13

think it is important that that be clarified.

Obviously

14

With respect to the emergency room issue, your Honor,

15

in addition to the fact that there was no credible evidence, no

16

expert testimony provided with respect to the care provided in

17

the emergency room, since Dr. DeVore' s testimony was precluded,

18

we also think a directed verdict is a proper vehicle at this

19

time because the plaintiffs put no evidence in, nor could they,

20

that Dr. King, the emergency room physician, was an employee of

21

or an agent acting on behalf of McKay-Dee Hospital or IHC.

22

fact of the matter is, your Honor, he was not.

23

independent contractor and under the law as we've cited it in

24

our brief, McKay-Dee Hospital or IHC is not responsible for the

25

acts of an independent contractor.

The

He was an

But nonetheless, there is

no credible evidence that anything he did deviated from the
2

standard of care since Dr. DeVore•s testimony was precluded.
With that, your Honor, we would submit it to the

3
4

Court and ask that the directed verdict be granted.

5
6

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Casey.

Mr. Frankenburg or

Mr. Williams.

7

MR. FRANKENBURG:

8

THE COURT:

9

Thank you.

No motion, your Honor.

Okay, no motion.

This is only as to IHC

involvement?
MR. CASEY:

Your Honor, we also had a proposed order,

may I submit it?
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. CASEY:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Burbidge, Mr. Forgette.

MR. BURBIDGE:

Thank you, Mr. Casey.

Thank you very much, your Honor.

This

is a complex case made more complex by divergent opinions of
the two defendants about what occurred.

And the reconstruction

of medical records despite what they plainly say.

And spins on

the medical records that seem to contradict what they plainly
say.
Let me take the ER first of all.

There is an

emergency room record that clearly indicates that Shelly
Hipwell in her third trimester went to the emergency room.
went to McKay-Dee Hospital.

She

She did not go to an independent

contractor, she went to the McKay-Dee Hospital emergency room
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there is an allegation that Dr. King may or may not be an
independent contractor working in an emergency room in your
opinion is irrelevant because it's the IHC staff and facilities
that render the care?
MR. BURBIDGE:

Yeah.

were going to call Dr. King.
call Dr. King.

They were —

they said they

Apparently they're not going to

But she didn't go to see an independent

contractor, she went to see McKay-Dee Hospital and they took
her in, registered her in, whoever they hire to do their job,
to do their bidding, that's their responsibility.
THE COURT:

Very well, thank you.

MR. CASEY:

Yes, your Honor.

Anything more,

Mr. Casey?

MR. BURBIDGE:

Let me just make —

I apologize.

To

get your Honor focused on that, the cases I talked about, if I
go to my doctor, let's say Dr. King is my doctor, he's an
OB-GYN and I go see to my doctor in the hospital, that's a
different implication.

That's not what these cases address.

I

don't address IHC running an emergency room, we have no control
how they staff it and we have no choice of who they put in cur
care.
THE COURT:

I understand, thank you.

MR. CASEY:

Your Honor, what's clear-cut here is the

plaintiffs have rested.

Mr. Casey.

They had every opportunity to put in

whatever evidence they felt they needed to put in.

They could
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have called Dr„ king and found out what his relationship was,
what he did, what he didn't do.

They could have asked Shayne

as to whether when they went to the emergency room were they
looking to IHC, were they looking to McKay-Dee.

Or in fact

when she saw Dr. King, did he think he was IHC, whatever.

The

fact of the matter is they put no evidence in, none whatsoever,
that Dr. King is connected in any way to IHC.

And in fact, we

know he's not because he's just an independent contractor.

And

we've cited the cases here, your Honor.
Secondly, about -- let's talk about what's clear-cut.
And we have marshalled the evidence that we need to prevail on
a motion for directed verdict.

Primarily, being the exclusion

of the proffered expert testimony of Dr. DeVore.

Your Honor,

it's not what Shelly expected or what Shayne expected back in
1988 at this point.

What is relevant on this motion is what

did plaintiffs through their counsel put into the record in
their case.

The fact of the matter is over two years ago when

Dr. DeVore was first starting to opine in this case they knew
that we objected to his testimony in areas where he was not
expertized, they knew that.
They had full opportunity in this case to bring in an
emergency room physician as an expert, someone qualified to
testify as to the standards of care and any breach of that care
and whether it caused any injury.

We now are being told that

the jury can draw a fair inference that the ER doc here did

1799

something wrong because of some of the testimony that came in.
THE COURT:

Is there any evidence at all that there

is any testimony or evidence to support the proposition that a
standard was breached in the emergency room?
MR. CASEY:

There is none in this record, your Honor.

And more important, there is no evidence in this record what
the standard is.

We heard what an intensivist might do or an

OB might do, but as the Court initially ruled before trial, the
issue here is did this ER physician do anything wrong faced
with what evidence he was faced with.

There is an absence.

You know, there's a suggestion, your Honor, that if the patient
was hypertensive —

well, even the OB ! s can't agree what's

hypertensive or not hypertensive, or whether there was protein
in the urine.

Even the OB's can't agree as to what was

abnormal or normal with respect to protein in the urine.

And

certainly there's some disagreement about epigastric pain.
The fact of the matter is you can't ask eight lay
people to decide themselves what the standard is and then
decide whether someone breached it, that's just clear, your
Honor.
With respect to the transfer, if you look at
section -- or Exhibits D and E of our motion or memo, the Court
clearly excluded DeVore's testimony with respect to the
intensivist role and the decision to transfer.
only with respect to an OB.

It was admitted

There is a difference.

And ag<iin,
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your Honor, over two years ago plaintiff and their counsel
could have called an intensivist to come in and testify with
respect to the care provided by Dr. Baughman.
not to.

Counsel chose

They rolled the dice and the expert, Dr. DeVore, his

testimony in this area was excluded.

Again, lay people cannot

answer that question, the Supreme Court cases are clear on
that.

And directed verdicts in these two areas should be

granted.

Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT:

advisement.

Thank you.

I'm going to take it under

Let's move on with the next witness.

I'll take a

break at 10:00 and then I'll take the bench outside the
presence of the jury before they come back at 10:15 to announce
this.
MR. FISHLER:

Your Honor, could we take like a

five-minute break now to line up some exhibits?
THE COURT:

Can't we get on with 20 minutes of

Dr. Baughman first?
I'm sorry, Mr. Burbidge.
MR. BURBIDGE:

I apologize.

There was one point

made, and I don't know if your Honor would hear from me, that
misstated the record.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

MR. BURBIDGE:

And it's important.

They indicate

that the record is clear that Dr. King was an independent
contractor.

Of course there is no such record to that effect.
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1

And when the Court asked is there any evidence on breach of the

2

standard of care in the ER, there is clearly a commitment to

3

follow-up.

4

information, clearly that is a breach.

5

physician coming in and saying this is the standard of care.

6

This is a commitment contractually made by the ER and may or

7

may not have been breached depending on the evidence.

8
9

There is evidence that that's important
It doesn't have to be a

We would also like to proffer if we can
Dr. Baughman's deposition, pages 17 to 22.

He is an agent of a

10

party, he's an employee of a party, he testified that he worked

11

in the ER room, this is part of what we would have put on had

12

we been permitted.

13

experience would have followed up with the information that the

14

ER doctor had.

Worked in the ER room, and based upon that

15

THE COURT:

All right.

16

MR. CASEY:

We would object to that obviously, Your

17

Honor, it's not part of the record.

18

THE COURT:

Very well.

19

MR. FISHLER:

20

THE COURT:

Your Honor, could I have five minutes?

All right.

Don't you have just some

21

preliminary questions of Dr. Baughman first and we can take a

22

break at 10:00 and we can all have some time to think over

23

things?

24

MR. WILLIAMS:

25

THE COURT:

Can I remove that exhibit?

Yes.

Bring in the jury.

I

1

not allow anyone to discuss it with you.

Please do not form or

2

express an opinion on the matter until it is submitted to you

3

for your decision.

4

quarter after 10:00.

5

the bench out of the presence of the jury at a quarter after

6

10:00.

The jury will be excused until at least a
The Court has indicated that it will take

7

(A brief recess.)

8

(The following proceedings were held in open court

9

out of the presence of the jury.)

10

THE COURT:

The record will show that we are in

11

session outside the presence of the jury.

12

opportunity to review my notes, the motion and my recollection

13

of the record.

14

record and my recollection of my notes in this matter and

15

previous testimony as to the emergency room, the fact that

16

Dr. King may or may not have been an independent contractor in

17

this matter is irrelevant as to the Court's decision.

18

record is is prior to argument, the record was silent as to his

19

status.

20

relevant.

21

Thank you for the

Based upon previous rulings in review of the

The

And furthermore, the Court did not find that to be

However, as to the emergency room standards and

22

breaches of the standards, upon review and upon my

23

recollection, it is my opinion that there was no competent

24

evidence that was elicited as to whether or not that treatment

25

in the emergency room on the 12th of December deviated and/or

1Q1/1

1

breached any standard of care.

2

recollection and review there was no competent evidence as to

3

what that standard of care may have been.

4

emergency room, the motion for partial directed verdict is

5

granted.

And furthermore, upon my

Therefore as to the

6

As to the transfer, however, the Court is satisfied

7

that there is enough evidence on the record through competent

8

testimony that the jury will have to make that determination.

9

So denial as to partial directed verdict regarding the

10

transfer.

11
12

Draft up the appropriate order at the appropriate
time.

13

MR. CASEY:

We will, your Honor, thank you.

14

THE COURT:

Thank you.

15

With that, are we ready to

proceed with Dr. Baughman?

16

MR. FISHLER:

17

THE COURT:

18

(The proceedings were resumed in open court in the

We are, your Honor.
Thank you.

19

presence of the jury.)

20

THE COURT:

The record will
WJ.J.J. show that remain in

We have now been joined by •the jury.

21

session.

22

members are present and seated. »Jury , thank you for your

23

patience in this matter.

24
25

All juror

Dr-. Baughman remains on the stand subject to further
direct exami nation by Mr. Fishier
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Defendant McKay-Dee Hospital's Motion for Partial Directed Verdict, having
been filed pursuant to Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, came before this
Court for hearing on Monday, April 9, 2001, in the above-entitled matter. The Court,

having reviewed defendants' motion and memorandum, having heard oral argument,
and being fully advised in the premises, enters the following ORDER:
Pursuant to Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court precluded
plaintiffs' proffered expert, Dr. Greggory DeVore, from testifying on the applicable
standard of care regarding the care provided to Shelly Hipwell by an emergency room
physician at McKay-Dee Hospital and whether that standard was breached on the basis
that Dr. DeVore lacked the qualifications to offer such testimony. Without any such
testimony, there is no competent evidence to support a finding of medical malpractice
based on an alleged deviation of that standard of care by the emergency room
physician at McKay-Dee Hospital. As a result, this Court grants Defendant McKayDee's Motion for Partial Directed Verdict with respect to plaintiffs' claims that McKayDee Hospital was negligent in treating Shelly Hipwell in the emergency room on or
about December 12,1988.
With respect to plaintiffs' claim that defendant McKay-Dee Hospital breached an
applicable standard of care with respect to its role in the decision to transfer Shelly
Hipwell to the University Hospital, the Court find that there is sufficient evidence to
submit that claim to the jury. As a result, this Court denies defendant McKay-Dee
Hospital's Motion for Partial Directed Verdict with respect to plaintiffs' claim that McKayDee Hospital was negligent in connection with its role in the decision to transfer Shelly
Hipwell to the University Hospital.
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DATED this&^ >_ . day of April, 2001.
BY THE COURT

Glenn K. Iwasaki, District Judde

Approved as to form:
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
By
Richard D. Burbidge
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

STRONG & HANNI
Philip R. Fishier
BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY
Richard W. Casey
Andrew G. Deiss
JAMES W. GILSON
By_
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc.,
dba McKay-Dee Hospital

WILLIAMS & HUNT
Elliott Williams
Kurt M. Frankenburg

By

^ ^ / A K
Attorneys for Defendant
Michael J. Healy

vl
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Third Judicial District

PR 1 2 2001
LAKE doUNTY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL, individually and on behalf of all
other heirs of SHELLY HIPWELL, and
ASHLEY MICHELE HIPWELL and
KAYCIE SHAYLENE HIPWELL appearing
by SHAYNE HIPWELL as guardian ad
litem,

SPECIAL VERDICT

Civil No. 920904182 VCV
Judge Glenn Iwasaki

Plaintiff,

IHCHOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAY-DEE
HOSPITAL, and MICHAEL J. HEALY,
M.D., and DOES I through X,
Defendants.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the
evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented,
answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot
determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the evidence
preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No." Also, any damages
assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

1.

Considering all the evidence in this case, was the defendant, Michael

J. Healy, M.D., negligent in the care of Shelly Hipwell?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

If your answer to Question No. 1 is "Yes," proceed to answer Question
No. 2. If your answer is "No," skip ahead to Question No. 3.
2.

If your answer to Question 1 is "Yes," was such negligence a

proximate cause of the brain injury to Shelly Hipwell?
ANSWER:
3.

Yes

No

Considering all the evidence in this case, was the defendant, IHC

Hospitals, Inc., dba McKay-Dee Hospital, negligent in the care of Shelly Hipwell?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

/K

If your answer to Question No. 3 is "Yes," proceed to answer Question
No. 4. If your answer is "No," skip ahead to Question No. 5. If, however your
answers to Questions No. 1 and 3 are "No," please sign the verdict form and notify
the court.
4.

If your answer to Question 3 is "Yes," was such negligence a

proximate cause of the brain injury to Shelly Hipwell?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

If your answer to either Question No. 2 or Question No. 4 was "Yes,"
proceed to Question No. 5 and the following questions.
5.

Assuming the combined negligence of all responsible persons and/or

entities to total 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable to:

A. Defendant, Michael J. Healy, M.D.

%

B. Defendant, IHC Hospitals, Inc.
dba McKay-Dee Hospital

%

C. University of Utah Hospital

%0

TOTAL
6.

100%

If you have answered either or both Questions 2 or 4 "Yes," state the

amount of general and special damages, if any, sustained by Plaintiffs as a
proximate result of Shelly Hipwell's brain injury.
General Damages:
: Pain and Suffering of Shelly
Hipwell from the time of her
brain injury until the time of
her death

$

: Damages suffered by
Plaintiffs as a result of
Shelly Hipwell's wrongful
death

$

Special Damages:
: Loss of Earnings
(less consumption)

$

: Loss of Household Services

$

: Funeral Expenses

$

: Medical Expenses

$

: Other Expenses

$

TOTAL

$

DATED this / / ^ day of April, 2001.

Foreperson

STRONG & HANNI
Philip R. Fishier (1083)
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 801/532-7080
BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY
Richard W. Casey (0590)
Andrew G. Deiss(7184)
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: 801/533-8383

P i U I DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

APR 2 h 2001
i

-> aALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

JAMES W. GILSON (1197)
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: 801/533-8383
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc.,
dba McKay-Dee Hospital
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Elliott J. Williams (3483)
Kurt M. Frankenburg (5279)
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 801/521-5678
Attorneys for Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE
HIPWELL, etal.,

JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 920904182CV
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAYDEE HOSPITAL; MICHAEL J. HEALY,
M.D.; and DOES I through X,
Defendants.

(Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki)

The above-entitled matter came for trial before the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding, on
March 27-30, April 2-5, and April 9-12, 2001. The jury of eight men and women was
duly empaneled. The plaintiffs appeared personally and by and through counsel,
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq. and Jason D. Boren, Esq. of Burbidge & Mitchell and Simon
H. Forgette, Esq. Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D. appeared personally and by and
through counsel, Elliott J. Williams, Esq. and Kurt M. Frankenburg, Esq. of Williams &
Hunt, and defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba McKay-Dee Hospital, appeared by and
through counsel, Philip R. Fishier, Esq. of Strong & Hanni, Richard W. Casey, Esq. and
Andrew G. Deiss, Esq. of Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & Casey, and James W.
Gilson, Esq. The parties fully presented their evidence and arguments and the jury was
instructed and directed, pursuant to Rule 49(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to return
a special verdict in a form approved by the Court. On April 12, 2001, the jury, having
duly deliberated, returned the Special Verdict form, with six jurors having reached a
verdict by answering "no" to the following special interrogatories:
1. Considering all the evidence in this case, was the defendant Michael J. Healy,
M.D., negligent in the care of Shelly Hipwell?
ANSWER:

Yes

No X

3. Considering all the evidence in this case, was the defendant IHC Hospitals,
Inc., dba McKay-Dee Hospital, negligent in the care of Shelly Hipwell?
ANSWER:

Yes

No X

2

Based on the foregoing responses of the jury to the special interrogatories,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendants be
awarded judgment of no cause of action on plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint,
thereby dismissing plaintiffs' claims against the defendants with prejudice and on the
merits;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba McKay-Dee Hospital, is hereby awarded judgment against
plaintiffs for costs in the amount of $

, and defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D. is

hereby awarded judgment against plaintiffs for costs in the amount of $

, both

with interest accruing thereon as provided for by law until such judgment is satisfied.
lis
DATED this

day of

.,2001
BY THE COURT

Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki, District
Approved as to form:

Richard D. Burbidge, Esq.
Simon H. Forgette, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantially
the same as Rule 19, Utah Rules of Evidence

(1971). Rule 56(1), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), contained similar language.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Pregnancy.
Relation LO expert testimony.
Cited.
Pregnancy.
The admission of a mother's testimony on the
subject of gestation period of her pregnancy
was not error. Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640
(Utah 1982).
Relation to expert testimony.
Trial court properly admitted testimony of a

security guard, who compared a photograph of
a footprint to the footprints that he saw at
burglarized premises. The fact that a question
might be capable of scientific determination
does not make lay opinion inadmissible if the
provisions of this rule are met. State v. Ellis,
74S P.2d 188 (Utah 1967).
Cited in State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah
Ct. App. 199S).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Ability to see, hear, smell, or otherwise sense, as proper subject of opinion by la}r
witness, 10 A.L.R.3d 258.
Competency of nonexpert's testimony based
on sound alone as to speed of motor vehicle
involved in accident, 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.
Admissibility of nonexpert opinion testimony
as to weather conditions, 56 A.L.R.Sd 575.

Competency of nonexpert witness to testify,
in criminal case, based upon personal observation, as to whether person was under the influence of drugs, 21 A.L.R.4th 905.
Admissibility of lay witness interpretation jf
surveillance photograph or videotape, 74
A.L.R.5th 643.

Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert b}7 knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 56(2), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971), was substantially the
same.
Cross-References. — Blood tests to determine parentage, expert testimony, §§ 78-45a-7,
7S-45a-10.

Discovery of expert's opinion, Rule 26(b)(4),
U.R.C.P.
Drug paraphernalia, expert opinion in determining nature of object as, § 58-37a-4.
Pretrial conference, consideration of limiting
number of expert witnesses, Rule 16, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Basis for opinion.
Discretion of court.
Foundation.
Polygraph evidence.
Qualification as expert.
Reliability.
Scientific evidence.
—Hypnosis.
—Polygraph examinations.
Subjects of opinion.
—Drug use.
—Identification.
—Recording.
—Securities fraud.
—Sexual abuse.
— Simulation.
— Suicide.
Cited.
Basis for opinion.
Testimony of expert witness who relied on

conversations with witnesses out of court was
admissible, since he may have meant he fourd
statements of witnesses reliable for purposes of
his making judgment. Lamb v. Bangart, 515
P.2d 602 (Utah 1874).
Facts or data used by a properly qualified
expert in forming an opinion need not be :n
evidence if they are of a type reasonably relied
on by experts in the witness's field of expertise.
Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,
682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).
Trial court did not err in allowing an expert's
testimony relating to drug experience reporcs
not in evidence. Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).
Expert's testimony was properly excluded
where witness was unable to give his opinicn
based upon data made known to him at trial,
as, absent personal knowledge of the facts, this
was the only ground on which the evidence
could have come m. Highland Consrr. Co. v.

78-14-4

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
medical personnel for death or injury to mother
caused by improper postdelivery diagnosis,
care, and representations, 6 A.L.R.5th 534.
Medical malpractice: who are "health care
providers," or the like, whose actions fall within
statutes specifically governing action and damages for medical malpractice, 12 A.L.R.5th 1.

A.L.R. — Liability for medical malpractice in
connection with performance of circumcision,
75 A.L.R.4th 710.
Liability of hospital, physician, or other
medical personnel for death or injury to mother
or child caused by improper treatment during
labor, 6 A.L.R.5th 490.
Liability of hospital, physician, or other

78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury,
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged
act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is
that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff
or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the
patient's body, whichever first occurs; and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of
minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision
of the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion
of time allowed under former law; but any action which under former law could
have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of this act
may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of this act.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 4; 1979, ch. 128,
§ 1.
"Effective date of this act." - The phrase
"effective date of this act" in Subsection (2)
means the effective date of Laws 1976, Chapter
23, which became effective April 1, 1976.

Cross-References. - Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in malpractice actions,
§ 78-12-47.

328

